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Summary 
This thesis sets out to analyze the different components of the political ideology of the 
Prophet’s Ummah. By analyzing the various texts the group has published online, the 
videos they have posted, and various other books, research papers and so on, I have 
explained exactly what the ideological beliefs of the Prophet’s Ummah, and see how 
they fit in with the historical roots of Islamism, as well as other contemporary groups. 
The first part of the analysis is of the general theoretical beliefs. The groups of ideas 
are defined as descriptive of the world, normative as to how the world should be, and 
method for achieving this. The second part is to uncover which concrete 
recommendations the group has for the state and society based on the ideas. 
My main findings are that the Prophet’s Ummah is almost a perfect fit when it comes 
to the theoretical basis of Islamism. They show almost every indicator when compared 
to the historical consensus of what Islamism is, and are sufficiently related to the other 
contemporary groups.  
The main descriptive beliefs are that they believe that Islam is struck in some form of 
civilizational struggle with the rest of the world, particularly the West, that this war is 
both of a physical and ideological nature, and that the influence from outside-sources 
has weakened and infected the perfect system given to mankind by Allah; Islam. The 
normative is that all people should follow a specific type of sharia, which is a divine 
set of rules meant guide both social and political life. Their recommendation is an 
Islamic State, or a Caliphate, based on these rules. This must be achieved by any 
means necessary. As such, they defend the use of violence, and adhere to an offensive 
understanding of jihad. 
The concrete solutions and recommendations however, are few. My main conclusion 
is that the Prophet’s Ummah is clear on what they perceive to be the problem, but not 
on how to solve it. The analysis uncovers that apart from the general belief in an 
Islamic State, there are few coherent proposals on what it would look like, and how it 
would run. 
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1 Introduction 
Few emerging ideologies have gathered more attention in the recent years than radical 
Islamic movements. Especially after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in 
2001, the rise of Islamism has had a profound effect on both the understanding of 
Islam in the West and the application of real-life politics in the Arab world. With the 
subsequent attacks in London and Madrid, the continuing resistance of Taliban in 
Afghanistan, the beheading of Lee Rigby in the streets of London and other such 
incidents, the literature on the different strands of what has gotten the   —maybe 
unfortunate— label of “political Islam” has grown substantially and the contemporary 
relevance of such studies has only increased.  In recent times, the founding of the so-
called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in 2014 has once again brought Islamism into the 
public discourse, as well as made it the main talking point in current international 
affairs. Furthermore, as Islamism has risen as a factor in the Middle East so has 
different groupings of sympathizers emerged in the Western world, particularly in 
France, the UK, and Denmark.  
Though they vary in terms of size, popular support and ideological background, these 
groups have adopted many common characteristics that distinguish and unite them. 
Operating in the boarders between religion and political ideology, they believe Islam 
to be something more than a “mere” religion; its teachings should be a part of all 
aspects in a person’s life (Berman 2003). In most cases they also share resentment not 
only to the western social system, but also what they perceive as “religious weakness” 
shown by more moderate Muslims immigrating and integrating into western societies 
(Tibi 2012: 9). Perhaps most importantly, they believe that influence from the secular 
and democratic western societies are inherently opposed to the true meaning of Islam 
as din wa-dawla - both religion and state/law (Euben and Zaman 2009: 29-35). This 
means, among other things, that they see Islam’s sharia as a de facto constitution 
applicable to all societies; a non-debatable collection of divine rules that should 
constitute the basis for which all other law is based on. It is therefore the role of all 
Muslims to live by sharia, and demand it to be implemented everywhere Muslims live.  
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It should, however, be noted that it is often assumed that Islamism is simply the 
political part of Islam, giving it religious legitimacy among some, if not all, Muslims. 
Terms such as Islamists, Fundamentalist Muslims, Radical Muslims, and Muslim 
Terrorists as concepts are more often than not used indiscriminately and 
interchangeably to describe what in reality is a rather large spectrum of political and 
theological ideas (Hansen and Keinz, 2007: 55) (Goli and Rezaei, 2010: 13). 
Therefore, for many in the West, the conceptual difference between what Islam is as a 
religion and what Islamism is as an ideology, is often blurred. For example, comparing 
Islamists (people who follow the political ideology of Islamism) with fundamentalist 
Muslims (religious people who adhere to a conservative understanding of their 
religious texts and traditions) creates a rather fragile basis of comparison. While there 
are certainly people who overlap in this respect (one must be Muslim to be an Islamist, 
or at least be accepted as one), one cannot simply take the two to mean the same thing.  
This misuse of terminology has led to quite a few misconceptions about the inherent 
role of politics in Islam, the view of an average Muslim on political matters, and the 
degree of separation between religion and politics in the Muslim societal sphere. Most 
of the research done on the topics of Muslims view on democracy, for example, point 
out that Muslim publics worldwide are supportive of democratic forms of government 
and the division between religious and governmental institutions, favor free speech, 
and that a clear majority of Muslims living in the West don’t want religious law to be 
implemented at state level (Pew Research Center 2005; Pew Research Center 2006; 
Esposito and Mogahed 2007; Pew Research Center 2008; Fish 2011; all cited in 
Elgvin 2011: 2). On the contrary, as Wiktorowicz (2005) points out, many moderate 
Muslims, both spiritual leaders and other proponents of a peaceful co-existence and 
integration of Muslims into other societies, have received death threats from radicals 
who view them as traitors to the “true” Islam. As these groups reject the more 
moderate Muslims through takfir, which is a custom of declaring another Muslim a 
non-believer or an apostate, one should be careful to define them within the general 
accepted context of the religion Islam. Instead, one should focus on the ideological 
strands of thinking such groups of Islamists promote in their political work, not how 
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they excuse themselves in their own religious conviction. This thesis will partly serve 
to define the distinction between Islamism and fundamental Islam, and in essence look 
at Islamism as a political standpoint, not a religious calling. 
To differentiate and put them in an academic context, the Islamist groups seem to 
adhere to a somewhat crude version of Huntington’s (1996) “Clash of Civilization”-
theory with regards to the understanding of the Islamic Ummah (Followers) as being 
under attack from outsider influence, most importantly the West, both in a practical 
and theological sense. This, together with a common goal of implementing an Islamic 
state obeying an extreme form of sharia, are what make up the general comparative of 
such organizations. The more radical elements within the groups are also known to 
promote the collective action of jihad, or what they believe is theological justified 
“holy war” against various targets deemed enemies of Islam or promoters of a kuffar - 
non-believers - lifestyle. Drawing from Islamist intellectuals and activists like Hassan 
Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, they have defended the 
various terror attacks carried out on civilian targets as the work of martyrs, and some 
even going as far as to protest against the incarceration of those responsible, like the 
Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, or the pair of converts who performed 
the public killing of Lee Rigby, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale. In the 
last few decades, thousands of members associated with various groups from all over 
Europe have been reported traveling to conflict areas around the world, such as Syria, 
Iraq, Palestine, Libya, etc. to fight in the name of Islam, Allah, and sharia 
(Wiktorowicz 2005: 3-4).  
1.1 How Islamism came to Norway 
In the world today, there are quite a few organizations that falls under the umbrella of 
Islamism. Perhaps the most well-known is Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hizbollah, Al-Qaida, 
Taliban, and ISIS/ISIL. As these organizations have grown exponentially in the last 
century, so has different political activists founded likeminded groups in Europe, 
either non-affiliated like Islam4UK in the United Kingdom, or as local representations 
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of the larger organization, like Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Germany (Vidino 
2015).  While groups like these have existed for some time in other European 
countries, the Norwegian local chapter of Islamists is quite a recent political 
phenomenon. 
In September 2012, 3.500 people showed at Youngstorget in Oslo up to protest against 
the movie “Innocence of Muslims”, an American-made movie depicting the “real” life 
of the prophet Muhammad (Akerhaug 2012). However, this peaceful gathering where 
overshadowed in the media by another group gathering outside the American embassy 
a few blocks away. Around 50 people had gathered not only to show their opposition 
to the movie, but also in order to express their support for Al-Qaida and its members, 
and their hatred for America, NATO, and its western allies. Declaring the other 
demonstration and the Islamic Council of Norway as “hypocrites” who “…only work 
to appease the Norwegian government and people” and therefore were in 
“contradiction to the true Islam”, they announced themselves as the only true Muslims 
(Akerhaug 2012). While they used to operate under the name Ansar al-Sunna, this 
group would soon be known as Profetens Ummah, or The Prophet’s Ummah in 
English, and has in the later years become the first public Islamist group in Norway.  
Directly translated the name means “The Prophet’s followers”, or “The Community of 
the Prophet”. Though the group is relatively new in the Norwegian political landscape, 
they have had an interesting and somewhat rocky beginning. Their spokesman, 
Ubaydullah Hussain, has been taken to court for allegedly making death threats against 
the now Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg. The ideological leader Arfan Bhatti, 
who previously has been imprisoned for gang-related criminal activities, has just come 
back to Norway as he was only recently released from being held captive by the 
Pakistani Police. Other members of the group have also been charged with making 
threats against various other public political actors in the Norwegian political scene, 
mainly Jens Stoltenberg, now the General Secretary of NATO. In a video published on 
YouTube, they declared him an “enemy of Allah”, claimed that Allah would “punish 
him for his actions”, and that he should “burn in hell for all eternity” (Akerhaug 2013: 
93). Through Facebook, their leaders have admitted to attending radicalization 
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meetings in the UK with the founder of the British radical Islamist group Islam4UK 
and Al-Muhajiroun, Anjem Chaudry, and have taken his words into practice by 
establishing different networks around Norway who both arrange meetings and invite 
potential new initiates (Akerhaug 2013: 130, NRK 2012a). The group itself has made 
different claims of having around 500-1000 active members and more than 2.000 
sympathizers, though the numbers confirmed and used by the Norwegian Police 
Security Service (PST) and other independent researchers are more in the range of 
200-300 in total (PST 2013). Around 50-70 members of the group have been reported 
traveling to IS to support the fighting and their appointed leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi—who now has announced himself as Amir al-Mu'minin Caliph Ibrahim, the 
Caliph of the Islamic State. Out of these, 7 are reported as dead or missing, among 
them one of Prophet’s Ummah’s former spokesmen, Egzon Avdyli. 
Even though the Prophet’s Ummah is a relatively new organization, it is surprising 
how little academic attention it has gathered from Norwegian scholars. Most seem 
content to either write the group of as “just another extreme or radical anti-
establishment youth group”, or simply denounce them as a loose band of young men 
and women who find the different traditions of Islamism enticing. Not until recently, 
with the rise of IS as a de facto sovereign power in the Middle East, has the group 
been deemed worthy of more scrutiny in order to understand the role of political 
Islamism in Norway. However, most of this attention has been with regards to either 
(a) the sociological aspect, such as how they recruit youth to their cause, who their 
potential recruits are, and so on in order to stop the “radicalization of youth”, such as 
Holmer (2014), or (b) the threat assessment of the group’s members to the Norwegian 
society or against certain individuals (PST
1
 2013) (PST 2014) (Sunde 2013). While 
these are important matters, it is still surprising how little research has been done on 
the group itself.   
Before one can classify, compare and categorize, one has to simply observe and study 
In contrast to the literature on other fringe political ideologies like communism, 
nazism, fascism, or liberalism, the analyses of Islamism as a political factor in Norway 
                                                 
1
 The Norwegian Police Security Services (PST) 
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is almost non-existent. The attention has been on the individual members of the group, 
rather than what the general consensus among its members is. While it is true that 
Prophet’s Ummah is neither a large ideological movement nor do they seem to be of 
influential political relevance anytime soon, they’re still a local representation of a 
larger transnational political ideology. Instead of scrutinizing this local chapter, most 
just apply the group different labels that seem to be based solely on their impressions 
or personal understanding. To not know what motivates Prophet’s Ummah, what their 
convictions are, how they will implement them and so on gives us a disadvantage not 
only in understanding the evolution of Islamism in different countries, but also gives 
us the opportunity to study how they themselves relate to other groups of like-minded 
individuals. For example, one of the political goals expressed by Ubaydullah Hussein 
is to change Norway in accordance with sharia and Islamic traditions (Kleivan et. al 
2014). This is a general statement which I believe require a greater scrutiny, and 
should not simply be accepted on a face-value. First of all, what does he mean by 
sharia? Sharia has many different meanings and understandings in the Islamic 
theological tradition. Which traditions is it that he wants implemented? And if it is a 
specific type of sharia, how will this fit in with the current framework of law that 
exists? This also implies that he believes that the Norwegian state and it laws are not 
operating in accordance with the laws of Allah. How might he then respond to the fact 
that Norway has made the list of top ten countries that are most Islamic in the political, 
economic, and social sense, coming in 9
th
 in 2010 and 6
th
 in 2014 (Askari and 
Scheherazade 2010/2014)? These are some of the questions I hope to give an answer 
to. By properly analyzing and defining the different ideas held by the Prophet’s 
Ummah, we can further try and fit them in a larger ideological spectrum. By 
examining both the expressed political ideas and the discourse and arguments behind 
them, we can come to a greater understanding of the group. 
Therefore, this paper simply wants to illuminate the broader range of opinions and 
beliefs held by Prophet’s Ummah, defined as “ideas”, in order to serve as a reference 
for future studies of the group, of political Islam in Norway, and maybe even different 
strands of political Islam in Europe. It is the authors’ hope that the findings and 
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conclusions presented in this thesis will serve as a stepping stone for further and 
deeper analysis of the different aspects and groupings of Islamism in Norway.  
1.2 Research question 
It is with the previous mentioned goals in mind that I will try to examine and explain 
the core, fundamental and integral political ideas of the Prophet’s Ummah’s ideology. 
The main research question of this paper will be:  
“How do the political ideas of the Prophet’s Ummah reflect the political 
ideology of Islamism, and what are their practical recommendations within this 
ideology?” 
This research question has two parts: first, I will explore how the Prophet’s Ummah’s 
ideas and beliefs fit in with the contemporary definition of Islamism. This is the 
ideology analysis as it is primarily defined in the context of political theory. This 
means that I will identify what “Islamism” is, through how it is understood in the 
general context and the history of its proponents, and the arguments presented as to 
why this is true. The analysis will be both on what ideas they represent, but also on 
how they argue and present their beliefs. The second part is more descriptive. Here, 
the main part is to include what practical policies the Prophet’s Ummah wants to 
implement. I hope to create base of comparison of their political stances given what 
we know about the group today. This will, for example, include how they believe 
economy will function in an Islamic state, what social rights the inhabitants of the state 
would have or not have, and so on. These two parts will be presented interchangeably, 
as it is difficult to exclude them when analyzing the overarching ideas themselves. So 
when I analyze how the Prophet’s Ummah view the Islamic state, all expressed 
practical components will be presented. This is so that all related beliefs are presented 
coherently. 
These questions will be answered through a case study of the group itself and its 
members. As there is little to no previous research done on Prophet’s Ummah, this will 
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be a primarily descriptive and interpretative paper. I see my thesis as one which seeks 
to illuminate and evaluate the assumptions many researchers seem to have when 
dealing both with groups like these, and with Islamists in particular, that they are, 
frankly, all the same. This is necessary because no other descriptive analysis have been 
done. It should therefore be noted that some of the sources here will be in Norwegian, 
both from the literature, and the text examined in this thesis. I have translated them all 
myself, so any faults with regards to this are my own. 
To put it in an academic context, I hope to continue on the work of Homer (2014), and 
Lia and Nesser (2014),in order for us to understand Islamism in a Norwegian context, 
and try to explain what kind of ideological views that might influence young men and 
women to join such groups. My contribution is an analysis of what the group 
represents, so that future researchers can build and improve upon it. This has not really 
been done before. It is for a reason that the Norwegian Police University College 
(PHS) research paper on “Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism on the 
Web” (Lia 2013) chapter on the Prophet’s Ummah as a case study of political 
extremism is without cited sources. There simply is none. Lia (2013: 108) even states 
that  
“[the PU] does not appear to have a unitarily developed ideology, and neither does it have 
an ideological guiding star that creates the agenda and course of the group”. 
Mind that this was written at the time Bhatti was missing and Hussain had stepped 
down as the official spokesperson. Now that Bhatti is back in Noway awaiting a trial, 
Hussain has resumed his position as spokesman, and they have officially, as a group, 
declared themselves as supporters of the Islamic State, I believe that such an 
ideological consensus might finally be discernable. 
1.3 Core concepts 
In order to avoid confusion when using different terminology, I would like to outline 
the different key concepts and how I define and understand them. While some of these 
concepts are contested, like jihad, sharia, et cetera, and one would be hard pressed to 
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find any single definition that caters to all readers, I find it is necessary to provide the 
definitions of how these terms will be used in this paper. The majority of these are 
taken from Olav Elgvin’s Master Thesis “Secularists, Democratic Islamists and 
Utopian Dreamers. How Muslim Religious Leaders in Norway fit Islam into the 
Norwegian Political System”, a thesis exploring how Norwegian Imams view 
democracy and the political system. Elgvin is both thorough and explicit in his 
definitions, and by using them here, I aim to keep this thesis somewhat coherent to 
other studies on adjacent subjects of interest. I have also included Islamism itself in 
this list, though chapter 3 will inspect and expand on its definition, as a starting point 
for readers new to the subject. Both here, and in the reminder of this thesis, I have also 
chosen to italicize  
Islam: The common usage of the word “Islam” is a simple reference to the 
monotheistic religion. However, as Elgvin (2011: 6) points out: “some researchers 
have stopped talking of «Islam» as a single concept, and instead speak of «Islams» – a 
way of speaking that emphasizes the diversity among Muslims when it comes to how 
they interpret and live the religion of Islam”. This is to differentiate between the 
multiple ways Islam is expressed by Muslims of different backgrounds and traditions. 
I choose to use the same understanding of the term Islam as Elgvin (2011: 6), who 
refers to the definition of the social anthropologist Talal Asad - to think of Islam as a 
discursive tradition. He defines a tradition as «discourses that seek to instruct 
practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of given practice that, precisely 
because it is established, has a history» (Asad 1986: 14, cited in Elgvin 2011: 6). This 
means that for a discourse to be regarded as Islamic, it must relate to the Islamic past 
or history – to claim that something is right because Buddha did it is not Islamic, but to 
claim that something is right because Muhammad did it, is Islamic (Elgvin 2011: 6).  
Muslim: The basic definition of a “Muslim” is a person who is a member of the 
religion Islam. Though this definition seems fairly straightforward, there are a few 
objections to be made in this understanding of the term. First, it can sometimes be 
difficult to define the distinction between an individual who practices Islam, and one 
who is Muslim in the sociological context (Elgvin 2011: 6). In the public discourse 
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one may talk about Muslim immigrants as the immigrants from predominantly Muslim 
countries, whether or not the person identifies himself as Muslim. Second, some 
people have defined themselves as “cultural” Muslims, which mean that while they see 
themselves in affiliation with the civilization of Islam or Muslim culture, they do not 
believe in or participate in the Islamic theological dogma (Hvidsteen 2007; cited in 
Elgvin 2011: 6). This thesis will try to differentiate between these three groups by 
simply keeping to the original definition presented here. All references to Muslims 
will mean the people who personally, and both actively or passively, accept the faith of 
Islam in the theological sense as defined above. This will include Shia- and Sunni 
Muslims, as well as converts from other ethnicities, and local sects or theological 
traditions.  
Islamism: The term “Islamism” might be defined in the words of Sheri Berman (2013: 
257) as “the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life”. 
This is a rather broad definition which can mean a whole range of things, and will 
probably include a larger part of those who only consider themselves moderately 
Muslim, and political parties who are based on conservative values taken from Islamic 
traditions. Still, this is the basic definition that will be used as a starting point for the 
literary review on Islamism as an ideology, which will be given in chapter 3.  
Sharia and fiqh: Sharia is generally considered to be guidelines as to how a Muslim 
should live; indeed the very name translates to “the path” or “the way”. It includes 
both rules and practices for marriage, economics and criminal law, and instructions on 
how a Muslim should behave in matters of spiritual and moral nature, such as praying 
(Marshall 2005:1). Sharia can be understood as the total will of God for mankind (or 
Muslims) - that can be interpreted in different ways. But for most Islamic scholars, the 
will of God for mankind has also entailed certain ways of regulating society. Islamic 
jurists attempted to interpret the sharia and the result were concrete rulings, most often 
referred to as fiqh. So when I refer to the Islamists perceived tradition, what I mean is 
that they want to implement rulings from traditional fiqh (Elgvin 2011: 6).  
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Jihad/jihadism: Jihad is an Arabic term which directly translated means “to struggle”. 
In the Islamic historic traditions, it has had two main meanings, one of internal self-
exertion, which is mainly about refusing to do sin, to fight ones negative urges and so 
on, and the other is physical fighting (Tibi 2012: 135). This duality in its definition is 
one of the key differences in how the term is understood in an academic discourse 
versus the in the general. To most Muslims, the term is used interchangeably, its 
meaning defined by the context in which it is used. In this thesis, I will concentrate 
more on the latter understanding, of which jihadism is the term primarily used. 
Jihadism is a term meant to cover the actions that are external and violent carried out 
in the name of Islam. When referring to Jihadism, I refer to the use of force against 
defined targets, both military and civilian, in order to promote one or more concepts of 
Islam, Sharia or Islamism. Jihad is here considered to be the method of fighting 
against the perceived threats against Islam or an Islamic way of living (Tibi 2012: 134-
135). A thorough explanation of the term and its usage will follow in chapter 3.  
As a final note, I must insist that the reader does not mix up the terminology used in 
this paper to be exact when it comes to the meaning of certain words or phrases as 
used in a theological tradition. For example, when I mention sharia with regards to 
Islamism, it is simply what Islamists mean when they talk about sharia, not 
necessarily what the consensus among Muslims is with regards to exactly which laws 
are followed, and how they are applied and so on. This is not a thesis with the aim of 
comparing Islamists ideology to Islam to find out who interprets it right or wrong, it is 
simply a description of Islamist ideology and how they understand certain concepts. 
1.4 Outline 
The outline of this paper is a simple one. First, I will present the methods and materials 
that are to be used. The empirical parts of this paper will be gathered through text 
(content) analysis, more precisely ideology-analysis. The majority of the existing data 
concerning the Prophets’ Ummah are found in written form, either through their 
website, their writings and interviews with different newspapers, their online 
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discussion forum, or other forms of media. Also, the Prophet’s Ummah has an 
extensive presence online, where they produce their own videos, stream lectures from 
around the world, and invite people to their meetings or seminars. All data found that 
can be traced back to the Prophet’s Ummah will be viewed as having potential empiric 
relevance to this paper, and will thusly be examined.  
Second, I will present a thorough literary review of Islamism as a political ideology, 
with a short historic introduction of the term, and how it has been incorporated into the 
various political fields in the Arabian world, followed by the current leading 
theoretical consensus. This will include how Islamism is defined, how it compares to 
other ideologies, what its main theological arguments are and how these ties in with 
the religion Islam. In order to put this thesis and its findings in a context, I will briefly 
go through the research that has been done both quantitative and qualitative on the 
general view Muslims have on Islamism and politics, and some case studies of 
different western Islamist groups and ideological leaders. This will also be where I 
conduct a clean-up on the different terms used in describing these groups, in order to 
separate the different theological and political understandings of Islamism. 
Third, I will present my findings and analysis. This part will be split in two. The first 
part will be an analysis on how the Prophet’s Ummah relates to the general ideology of 
Islamism. Using the defined ideas from chapter 3, I see both whether or not they 
adhere to the same general ideas, but also how they relate to the presented concepts. 
Here, both the conclusions and the argumentation used are what are being analyzed. 
The second part of the analysis will be what other political ideas, solutions and so on 
the Prophet’s Ummah convoy in their text and speeches that are important to the 
understanding of the group, but does not fit into the larger theoretical picture. Here, I 
have gathered all their views on both practical and normative matters, in order to 
examine them more closely. 
Lastly, I will continue on the argumentation from the previous chapter and have a 
short discussion about how the Prophet’s Ummah fit in with the general ideology, and 
convoy my concluding remarks.  
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2 Methods and materials 
My main and overarching goal with this thesis is to describe and define the various 
ideas held by the Prophet’s Ummah.  It is simply my intention to explore the political 
ideas of the group by starting with a somewhat blank canvas. In methodological terms, 
this means that this thesis will be a single-case ideology-study, using ideology-analysis 
method as described in in Bergström and Boreus (2012: 140-149), Bratberg (2014), 
and Mehta (2010). My case is the Prophet’s Ummah itself, and by analyzing their 
statements, press-releases, blogpost and online publications, I hope to give a detailed 
explanation as to what political ideas they share as a group.  
This goes against the more common way theory is used in political science, which is to 
start off with a theoretical viewpoint and then look at the data using said theory. This 
is especially noticeable in the quantitative works. Other studies on similar 
organizations have used widely different approaches, among them comparative in 
Høigilt (2014); sociological mobilization theory in McCabe & Pupcenoks (2013); or 
even cases of grounded theory, for example Pisoiu (2013). This thesis, however, will 
be a little different. First, it is not my intention to analyze the Prophet’s Ummah in 
order to explain some causal effect within the group, or to test a certain theory or its 
implications.  I simply aim to identify what ideas they represent and how these ideas 
manifest themselves, not, for example, explain why exactly these people came to 
believe this, or whether or not the Prophets Ummah behaves in accordance to the 
general literature on fringe groups. This leads us to the second reason: the research in 
this thesis will first and foremost be descriptive in nature, and is, as far as I know, the 
first real attempt to structure and analyze what we know about the Prophet’s Ummah. 
When analyzing, I will have no previous empirical data and little theoretical research 
on the group to compare my findings to. I cannot simply consult a given set of data or 
a previously done work to see if it might differ from my own in terms of data 
gathering or understanding. Therefore, the way this thesis is modeled is the way of an 
exploratory analysis. By defining the group as a simple gathering of like-minded 
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individuals, I will describe the various ideas that hold them together and are expressed 
outwards. 
2.1 Methods 
 
“Ideas are the cogwheels of politics, and are therefore what we should be examining 
in order to understand political actors and the decisions they make”  
Bratberg (2014: 57) 
Choosing how to analyze ones data is perhaps the single most important aspect of any 
scientific work. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, my thesis will be a case 
study of the Prophet’s Ummah. A case study should be familiar to most as a type of 
qualitative work were one seek to explain ones chosen variables in a single (or a few) 
case(s) (Gerring 2009: 17). Case studies seek to explain a certain phenomenon or data 
point by going in deep, as opposed to the more generalized approach done in 
quantitative research in large-N studies. Some believe the term “case-study” to mean 
choosing a case and examining whether or not a theory is falsified when applied to the 
case in question. This is not such study. This is a case study in the field of simple 
observation and definition. In other words, this is a case-study where the aspects and 
variables of the case itself is important, and in need of a more thorough understanding. 
According to Robert K. Yin, a case study approach is suitable if one wants to know 
how and why social phenomena work: “The method is relevant the more your 
questions require an extensive and 'in-depth' description of some social phenomenon” 
(Yin 2009: 4; cited in Elgvin 2011: 18). 
My chosen case is obvious; the Prophet’s Ummah represent the single largest Islamist 
group in Norway, and a rather unknown ideological entity as far as social research is 
concerned. Previous studies, like Holmer (2014) and Skoglund (2014) have focused on 
different aspects of the group’s members, mainly what drives them to join and how 
they perceive themselves within the context of the group. Additionally, one can read 
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“Norsk jihad - Muslimske ekstremister blant oss”, a book written by Norwegian 
journalist Lars Akerhaug (2013), which contains interviews with both members and 
leading figures about how they operate and how they came to join the PU. While it 
contains valuable information from various individuals on how the group works, there 
is little examination done of the ideas themselves. This thesis hope to expand and 
define the more general framework of ideology the group operates in.  
The variables I seek to explain in this thesis are of a somewhat more complex nature 
than what is usually the case in other case-studies. This thesis is what Gerring (2009: 
21) refer to as a case-study done synchronically: a study that aims to observe within-
case variation at a single point in, or frame of, time. As the variables of this study are 
the ideas themselves, and ideas can be commonly understood to be constantly in flux, 
being reconsidered and redefined as actors communicate and debate among 
themselves, I will try to mostly keep to those ideas that have been expressed from the 
moment of the Prophet’s Ummah’s first rally in 2012 and until today. The timeframe 
of which I have chosen to concentrate on is therefore between when the group was 
founded and up until January 2015. If I find that one or more of their ideas have 
changed within this period of time, it will be noted and expand upon in the analysis 
chapter. 
Originally, I intended to split the methodological approach in this thesis in two; one 
part where I used text analysis on their written work, and one part where I interviewed 
key members of the group. I contacted the group’s spokesman through his lawyer and 
set up an interview, but Hussain neither showed up nor responded when the questions 
were sent by mail. Other members of the group also later declined to answer through 
mail. This was, of course, an unfortunate turn of events, but I believe the data available 
through their texts are more than enough to provide the empirical grounds for the 
examination.  
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2.2 Analysis of Ideology 
An ideology is an often used, but difficult to define term in political science. For a 
thorough examination on how it has been used in social science and the different ways 
one might define “ideology”, see John Gerring’s (1997) article “Ideology: A 
Definitional Analysis”. He explains the term in how it conceptualizes itself in a 
comprehensive framework with 35 different attributes of the term within 7 different 
parts of what “ideology” constitutes. According to Gerring (1997: 966-967), these are 
all different uses the word has had when understood and used in social science. This 
makes it inherently difficult to operationalize what one means when one use the term, 
though he tries to rectify this by concluding with how the most important part of an 
ideology is that it must be coherent. Coherent refers to a set of idea-elements that are 
bound together, that belong to one another in a non-random fashion (Gerring 1997: 
980). Therefore, for this thesis, a sufficient explanation and definition of “ideology” 
would be that it is a catch-all term to cover a group’s or a collective’s coherent form of 
ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes, and opinions. In order for me to properly analyze the 
Prophet’s Ummah, I have chosen the approach to ideology and ideology-analysis as 
presented by Herbert Tingsten in Bergström and Boreus (2012: 140-149) and Øivind 
Bratberg (2014).  
Ideology-analysis is, broadly defined, the systematic study of one or more political 
messages. It is a qualitative analysis of how ideas are expressed and found in texts, 
with a mission of going behind the words to uncover its normative or descriptive 
claims, or understand what the perceived reality of its author is (Bratberg 2014: 57). 
This kind of textual scrutiny build on the assumption that ideas are the basis of what 
motivates a person in how he sees and understands the world. Ideas are here 
understood as a “thought construction which, in comparison with impressions or 
attitudes, is held with a certain kind of continuity (Bergstrom & Boréus 2005: 149, 
cited in Bratberg 2014:58; my translation). These ideas can be both of individual and 
collective nature, and they govern how our attitude towards certain questions or 
perceived correct political governance (Bratberg 2014: 58).  
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Ideas can further be divided in two main forms; normative and descriptive. 
Normative ideas summarize different beliefs one hold about what is good or bad in 
one’s society. “Children should be responsible for their own education” is a normative 
idea. Political normative ideas are general views on what one think is estimable 
behavior, and are in little ways open to empirical proof or investigation. Examples can 
include the biblical saying that “one should honor ones parents”, or the Marxist 
principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”, both 
which are normative statements. Normative ideas govern what actions or statements 
we assign positive or negative values to. These are of particular interest to us because 
of Islamism’s tendency to validate itself with Islamic values and theological traditions. 
Descriptive ideas are ideas or beliefs about how the world works, or assumptions of 
how things are related (Bratberg 2014: 58-59). Descriptive ideas will also often be 
causal beliefs. To think that “X is because of Y”, or “X happens when Y happens”, for 
example, is a product of one’s own cognitive thinking. I will stress the part of this 
definition regarding belief. Descriptive ideas are often assumptions made as a part of 
ones greater ideological beliefs, and thus vulnerable to be influenced by this more than 
any empirical findings. For example, if one believes that higher taxes on wealth lead to 
less incentive for them to work more, it does not really matter if it is proven true or 
not, it is still the person’s descriptive view on a causal relationship. However, these 
are, compared to normative ideas, possible to test and control, in what is referred to as 
critical idea-analysis. For more on this, see Bergström and Boreus (2012). 
Consider this in relation to the works of Tingsten. He adds another prerequisite to 
Bratbergs list. His claim is that an ideology contains three parts: (1) a formative 
premise of values, (2) factual and internally consistent claims of various causalities in 
society, and (3) concrete recommendations (Bergström and Boreus 2012: 141-142). 
The two first ones are comparable to normative and descriptive ideas, but the third one 
is of note. This is why my analysis in reality is two-folded. One where I see how the 
Prophet’s Ummah compares to other Islamist groups and one where I categorize which 
recommendations they present as to how society should be ran. As such, ideology-
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analysis is simply the methodological tool on how to study and explain these ideas 
within this framework. The analysis itself is done by interpreting the chosen texts in 
order to uncover the ideas behind them. 
This is methodological framework is what I will use in this thesis. In chapter 3, I will 
define which ideas are needed for a group to be classified as Islamist. Building on this, 
I will see whether or not the Prophet’s Ummah adheres to these ideas, or if they 
deviate from this in any way. Here, the context of their beliefs will also be considered 
as of major importance, by which I mean that it is not the conclusion in itself, but the 
way they arrive at it which is the crux of the analysis.   
The latter analysis will therefore be purely descriptive. Here, I simply analyze all the 
available texts and present the ideas of recommendation as they fit into the categories 
mentioned above. For example, when examining the Prophet’s Ummah’s views on 
sharia and society, I will include the suggested practical components that fit into this 
view, like what they believe sharia prescribes for marriage and social relationships, or 
on the legal status of non-Muslims. I find this to be an easier way of presenting the 
findings, because it gives me the possibility of first explaining the views and identified 
problems, and then directly explain what solutions they believe will solve the problem 
in question. 
2.3 Data 
The empirical data presented here is in short all the texts, interviews, blogposts, and 
videos made by or for the Prophet’s Ummah. Originally, I had intended two ways to 
obtain information: the interviews, and to use their official printings and the writing 
from their Facebook-page. The interviews, as previously mentioned, fell through when 
Hussain backed out, and their online activities all but ceased in the summer of 2014. I 
therefore had to seek other avenues of information. 
Gathering official and genuine texts proved to be a somewhat difficult ordeal. First of 
all, the Prophets Ummah does not outwardly work as a coherent and unitary group at 
all. The PU has no any official legal standing as an organization or as a 
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religious/political group. While the group seems to have rallied behind charismatic 
leaders such as Arfan Bhatti and Ubaydullah Hussain, there is no obvious coherent 
hierarchy within the group structure, no list of members and leaders, or political 
program other than the website bearing their name. The Prophet’s Ummah is, for 
example, not registered in the Brønnøysund Register Centre, a government-run agency 
responsible for the management of public registration in Norway, and thereby 
forfeiting grants the group could receive as a registered interest organization. This not 
only makes it inherently difficult to prove that a certain document or piece of text 
actually stems from the Prophet’s Ummah, it makes obtaining all possible information 
almost impossible. One must also remember that the Prophets Ummah did not 
officially exist prior to 2012, and most of their writings and discussions have taken 
place on the Internet, either in closed Facebook-groups or on rather unknown 
discussion boards on various websites, some in Arabic. Most of these have during the 
last year been removed or changed. Their Facebook-group was deleted sometime 
during the summer of 2012 after being reported as offensive, which meant that the 
most open forum available to journalists and researchers were gone.  
I have, however, still had some success in finding other venues of information. The 
texts used here are taken from their official website, profetensummah.com. The 
website has been up and running since 2012, and consists of different types of posts, 
from press-releases to guides on how one should behave in accordance to sharia, and 
so on. These texts will be the foundation of my analysis, and are considered to be some 
of the ideas that most, if not all, of the members agree upon, i.e. coherent. As they are 
posted on a publically accessible medium, I will also consider these posts to be the 
PUs “selling points” out to a broader audience. By this, I mean that the topics covered 
are meant both to capture the attention of potential new members, and to answer some 
of the different media-coverages of the group. This means that I will see these as a 
primary source of data, and should other sources contradict a point made in these, then 
the blog-post will in most cases be given precedence. All in all, the blog posts fill over 
50 pages covering multiple subjects of interest. The site is as of now, April 10
th
 2015, 
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deleted, but all the texts have been gathered and saved, and are available from the 
author on demand.  
Nevertheless, this blog has not been updated since mid-2013, and it is in the later 
months that PU has been the most active, both nationally and internationally. It is also 
not enough information available through this website to reach a conclusion with any 
degree of certainty regarding the practical application of its contents. Most of the posts 
are less than 1.500 words long, which is not enough to give a thorough description of 
the different topics. They also don’t offer any in-depth analysis of their preferred 
solution to the maintenance of society or solution to various questions raised by the 
texts themselves, such as what they will do to someone who rejects their societal 
system or ignore their laws. For example, the single largest contribution on the site is 
the article “44 ways to support Jihad”, but this is simply a direct translation of the 
work with the same name from Al-Qaida theorist Anwar al Awlaki (2009). While it 
certainly shows us how the Prophet’s Ummah might view jihad, or how they want 
their members to act in regards to it, it doesn’t answer the questions one might have 
about how they defend jihad from a theoretical standpoint, i.e. gives us an indication 
as to why they regard it as a necessary tool to further their agenda. 
To improve upon this lack of written content by the group itself, I have created a list of 
interviews their public spokesman, Ubaydullah Hussain, has had with various 
newspapers, as well with interviews with other previous leaders, and texts that can be 
traced to the group. Another source of data will be the various videos posted on 
YouTube by the group’s official account “Profetens Ummah”, and a book written 
about radical Islamists in Norway called “Norsk Jihad - Muslimske ekstremister blant 
oss” by journalist Lars Akerhaug (2013), which has many direct quotes from the 
previous leaders Bhatti and Mohyldeen. Additionally, I have transcribed the 43 minute 
long interview Ubaydullah Hussain had with the Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang 
(Kleivan et. al 2014) where he responded to questions both about the group itself and 
how they related to the then newly formed Islamic State. Lastly, I will also draw upon 
empirical findings and materials presented in other works regarding the Prophet’s 
Ummah. This will primarily include two master-theses written about the group before 
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this work is published: one from Ida Nord Holmer (2014) “In the name of Islam’. 
Explaining the appeal of militant Salafism in a Norwegian context” in which she 
studies what drives the members of Prophet’s Ummah to join, and Peder Skoglund’s 
(2014) MA study in criminology “Ekstremismens argumentasjon. Et 
maskulinitetsperspektiv på radikalisering og hatefulle ytringer på nett”.  
The data presented here is by no means all quotes or pieces of texts made by the 
Prophet’s Ummah or their members; such a collection would be nearly impossible to 
attain, but it is all the data that is readily available, coupled with data obtained by other 
researchers in the field. As such, I believe it sufficient to answer my research 
questions. 
2.4 Validity and reliability 
All scientific work tries to emulate the ideals of reliability and validity, in order for 
their findings to be of any significance. This is especially true for many of the social 
sciences, where one often needs to simplify the world at large in order to explain a 
possible causal relationship between two factors or sets of variables. 
By reliability, one means, of course, how reliable the results are; whether or not they 
can be reached by a different researcher analyzing the same data in the same way 
(Bhattacherjee 2012:56). Validity refers to whether or not the researcher is measuring 
what she wanted to measure and not something else (Bhattacherjee 2012:58). 
2.4.1 Reliability 
Ideology-analysis is a method of scientific discovery based in reading and 
interpretation. This means that the method is inherently low on reliability if not done 
correctly using an open analysis. This includes both the presumptions of the 
investigator herself, but also a potential bias in what works are chosen to represent the 
findings. The essence of whether the findings here can be thought of as reliable boils 
mainly down to a basic question; would another researcher end up at the same 
conclusions?  
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I hope to work around this by claiming the following: The material presented here is 
all the publically available empirical texts, videos, and comments, which can be traced 
back to the Prophet’s Ummah, their leaders, or their members.  A thorough 
investigation of other potential data has been done, and every piece of potential 
evidence has been analyzed. The findings presented here are therefore not the entirety 
of the potential sources of data, which might include private e-mails, online 
discussions no longer accessible and so on, but rather the official ideas of the 
Prophet’s Ummah as they themselves present it. From my own point of view, as long 
as I take care not to read too much into single sentences or short remarks, I believe that 
other researchers will arrive at both the same conclusions and findings as I present 
here. 
I am aware that the gathered data, especially in qualitative works such as this, are not 
innocent or without preconceptions from the author. I have, for example, already 
applied different terms to the group such as “Islamists” or “radicals” et cetera. This 
will probably influence how the various data are interpreted. Still, I hope to make my 
case for and discover different aspects of the Prophet’s Ummah’s beliefs by examining 
the data with as little bias as possible. Any error of judgement is purely my own. 
2.4.2 Validity 
Questions of validity are question of whether or not I have measured what I wanted to 
measure, and not something else. Case studies are generally thought to have good 
validity, and I consider this one to have to. All instances of the terminology I seek to 
analyze are given by the Prophet’s Ummah themselves. I consider the internal validity 
to be high because of this, the amount of direct quotes available, and the fact that the 
texts used in this analysis is written by them themselves. 
As for external validity, which deals with the generalization from these findings to a 
general universe, it is something I do not really think is of particular relevance. This is 
not a study on Islamism in general. It is not a study meant to be generalized to explain 
a larger phenomenon. This is a descriptive ideological study on one group. This seeks 
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to explain how the Prophet’s Ummah believe the world functions, their solutions to 
their perceived problems, and how they think society should be ran. It is a description 
of an explicit case of a phenomenon, and does not embody any explanations meant to 
be considered causal for other likeminded groups or organizations. I limit myself to 
explaining the group. The argumentation used by the Prophet’s Ummah is theirs, and 
does not mean that I believe this is the case of all other groups who operates within the 
same framework.  
With that said, I hope the results here will provide others with a set of data to expand 
upon in the future. This is my contribution to the ongoing academic discourse of the 
study of Islamists groups in the West; to identify and describe the various ideological 
beliefs held by the Prophet’s Ummah, and thus give future researchers a stepping stone 
to their own research. 
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3 Islamism 
Historically, Islamism is a word used almost exclusively to name the religious belief of 
Islam. From the late 17th century and until the start of the 20th, it was simply another 
way of describing Muslims, or a collective term to capture Islamic beliefs and culture 
(Mozaffari 2007: 17- 20). This changed mainly after ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution 
in Iran. With the formation of an entire political system based on religious laws, a new 
terminology was needed in order to effectively describe it. At first, this led to many of 
the words we still use today to describe different strands of Islamism; “Islamic 
fundamentalism”, “radical islam” or “Muslim extremists”. However, while they 
clearly try to emulate the fact that what happened in Iran, and to a lesser extent in 
Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood, they each represent a new form of Islam that was 
clearly distinct from the historical religion, and it proved difficult to say exactly what 
this new form included (Mozaffari 2007: 18). It was not until the 9/11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center towers that the necessity of a coherent understanding of the term 
became apparent. In the aftermath of 9/11, Western academics needed to explain both 
the religious and the political background and motivation for the beliefs of Osama Bin 
Laden and Al-Qaida.  
This chapter seeks to explain exactly what Islamism is, as well as put it into both a 
theological and political context. This is not a simple or easy undertaking. As 
mentioned above, both the public and the academic discourse on the subject are 
somewhat ambiguous when it comes to who and what they define as predominantly 
Islamist. I began this thesis by referring to a definition of Islamism put forth by Sheri 
Berman “the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life” 
(Berman 2013: 257). This definition was meant to make an initial statement as to what 
the term implies using an Occam’s Razor-approach to what I believe is the core of the 
ideology. While Berman’s definition is useful as a starting point, it has certain issues 
when more closely examined. First, it is a rather broad definition which can include 
whole range of different understandings, and will probably include a larger part of 
those who only consider themselves moderately Muslim, and parties who are based on 
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conservative values taken from Islamic traditions, not Islamism. This is why Islamism, 
if understood as a general term, is so inclusive of groups and movements with widely 
different aims and means. While they certainly share a comparable approach to the 
division (or lack of) between religion and state, there is little practical agreement 
between Iran, Al-Qaida and Saudi-Arabia on, for example, their relation to Sufism, 
jihad, or the finer points of how a society should function (Marshall 2005: 2) (Euben 
and Zaman 2009: 5-27). As such, while the definition addresses the key, solitary 
essence of groups and parties who call themselves Islamist, that Islam should regulate 
all of society, it fails to capture how and why Islamism is different from conservative 
Islamic tradition, or theological groups within the framework of Islam. If Berman’s 
definition were the only one, we would have to include other, more religious, groups 
like Islam.net together with the Prophet’s Ummah in our conclusion, because of their 
preference for a conservative Islamic lifestyle. The key to Berman’s definition is the 
use of the words “belief” and “guide”. These are simply not concrete or decisive 
enough to make a clear cut between cases in an ideological world. One might certainly 
believe sharia should guide your social or political life; one could probably presume 
that most imams or religious conservatives hold such opinions, which indeed they do 
(Elgvin 2011). But conservative religious clergymen are not necessarily Islamists. 
What we seek to understand is not the effect of an individual’s level of religious 
fundamentalism on their preferred political outcomes, but what constitutes and 
differentiates Islamists from other related political ideologies. 
In this chapter, I will therefore present my own working definition of Islamism, and 
what it contains of ideological components. I will build on the work of Bassam Tibi 
(2012), Mozaffari (2007), Sørensen (2012), and Euben and Zaman (2009) when 
discussing the ideological framework of Islamism, as well as Marshall (2005) and 
Schwartz (2005) on radical sharia-law. I have chosen to split the chapter in three parts; 
first the history, definition and how Islamism differs from Islam, followed by what we 
are looking for when examining the Prophet’s Ummah, and at last a concluding remark 
on contemporary state of Islamism with a short presentation of where other Islamist 
groups are in the ideological universe. The history section will include a presentation 
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of three central theorists and two groups in the Islamists world, Hassan al-Banna’s and 
Sayyid Qutb’s Muslim Brotherhood, Abu Ala Mawdudi’s Jamaat-i-Islami. Then I will 
identify the four major components of Islamism and see how other groups fit into this. 
3.1 What is “Islamism”? 
3.1.1 Defining Islamism 
So how may one alternatively define Islamism if one wishes to be more precise when 
dealing with it as an ideology rather than a broader political standpoint? I propose two 
definitions of Islamism to be examined for the purpose of our analysis of the Prophet’s 
Ummah; one from Euben & Zaman (2009) and another from Mozaffari (2007). The 
first one is  
“… contemporary movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the 
Muslim community, excavating and reinterpreting them for application to the present-
day social and political world” (Euben & Zaman 2009: 4). 
Here, the authors have included a more precise explanation of what exactly an Islamist 
want to accomplish; a return to a society based on the scriptural foundations of Islamic 
thought but a “modernized” version for use today. This rectifies many of the 
shortcoming of Bermans definition by explicitly refer to Islamism as an idea of 
returning to a mandated state and society as set out in the Koran and as exemplified in 
the early Muslim community. People, parties or politicians who simply want 
conservative policies based on their own religious beliefs are only understood to be 
Islamist if they belong in this category. This will therefore exclude those who simply 
want modern-day Islamic practices to guide the laws and regulations passed. The 
choice of words here is also worthy of note. Euben and Zaman uses “excavating” and 
“reinterpretating” in their definition, which has a particular relevance to Islamist 
thought. What they refer to is the Islamist belief of political and theological revival of 
what they perceive as the pure form of Islamic life and customs, often referred to as 
Salafism. The Quran, Sunna and hadith, is to be used as sources to implement Allah’s 
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will and guidance of the human race as a state of absolute law. This point will be 
expanded upon later in this chapter. 
The second definition I will examine is the one presented by Mehdi Mozaffari, an 
exiled Iranian professor living and working in Denmark at the moment. His 
explanation adds another prerequisite:  
“[Islamism] is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final 
aim is the conquest of the world by all means” (Mozaffari 2007: 21). 
Here, Mozaffari adds to his definition a whole another dimension of political belief, 
the intent on world-wide support and domination. Mozaffari explains this with the fact 
that Islamist groups, especially those who directly oppose both the West and todays 
Arabic countries, consider the current state of the world as one of failure. He states 
that: 
“To Islamists, the existing world is both wrong and repressive. […] because the 
existing world does not correspond to Islamic principles. Islam as a political power is 
no longer as predominant as it used to be in the past. The world is also considered 
repressive because non-Muslims occupy what the Islamists consider to be Muslim 
territory (e.g. Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya) or because Muslims live under severe 
repression from their own (anti-Islamic) governments” (Mozzafari 2007: 23). 
Mozzafari believes that a core understanding of the Islamist mind is that any Muslim 
living in today’s world is living in a world where the heavenly mandate of Islam is 
being repressed, or in the case of today’s Islamic states, expressed incorrectly. 
Following this, Islamist not only rejects non-Muslims, but also the states currently 
“masquerading” as Islamic states. This tie in with Euben and Zamans understanding of 
how Islamists view their ideal society; Muslims today no longer live as they should, 
because they are no longer ruled by the laws and habits expressed by the prophets and 
his first, second, and third generation of followers.  
The second part of his definition is also important. Islamist believes their ideology to 
be of value to the whole world. The religious dogmas they adopt are one of 
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completeness: the entire world and all of creation belongs to Allah, and therefore his 
word most is law for all mankind. Islamism’s goal is global. 
3.1.2 Islam and Islamism 
It should be noted that the definitions above does not include any sort of theological 
arguments. In the general discourse, one sees far too many who talks about “radical 
Islam” or “fundamentalist Islam”, and claim they are equal descriptions of the same 
phenomenon. These are statements that make little sense to the students of the 
respective disciplines. Islamism is about a political order, while Islam is a spiritual 
belief. Islamism is “religionized” politics grown out of a specific interpretation of 
Islam (Tibi 2012:1). Some terms frequently used in relation to Islamism are Salafism 
and Wahhabism, but these have little to do with what Islamism is as a political 
ideology. First of all, Salafism and Wahhabism have been around much longer, and are 
a part of both the judicial tradition and the cultural history of Islam. Second, they 
constitute religious dogmas, i.e. they are descriptive as to how the religion Islam 
should be practiced. While it might be true that many, if not most, of the Islamist are 
Salafists or even Wahhabis religiously speaking, this is a fundamental religious belief, 
not an ideological issue (Euben and Zaman 2009: 19-20). This is my critique of how 
some who have studied the Prophet’s Ummah, like Sveen and Wigen (2013) and to a 
lesser extent Holmer (2014), have used the term Salafi-jihadist when speaking about 
the Prophet’s Ummah and people related to them, as well as Caldwell (2009) who 
seems to be of the mind that Muslims in general believe the same as Islamists do.  
Central to the Islamists, as will be expanded upon later in chapter is the issue of 
believing todays Muslim communities are wrong and un-Islamic. Though they do not 
usually propose takfir on the other Muslims in their communities, they do hold the 
belief that liberal and secular intepretasions of Islam is wrong, as shown in Euben and 
Zamans definition. Thus, to Islamist, the majority of Muslims, i.e. those who do not 
belong to the deeply conservative portions of Islam’s theology like the Salafists and 
the Wahhabis, are considered to be enemies of the return of the Islamic State 
themselves, as well as the “correct” interpretation of sharia. Interestingly enough, this 
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creates a public discourse where there are multiple levels of people talking past each 
other. On one hand you have the general Muslim populace, who believe sharia to be 
Allah’s guidance to a good life, and jihad, if even applicable to their daily life, be 
something internal, and on the other hand, you have both the Islamists and the 
misinformed general discourse which take sharia to be one thing and one thing only, 
and jihad to be of an external character. This chapter will show how clear these 
differences between these understanding of sharia and jihad are, by showing exactly 
what Islamists have taken the two to mean. 
Furthermore, the religious state the Islamists seek to return is an invented tradition. 
The Islamist utopia is a relatively new invention; Islam has never had the kind of state 
that Islamists want. Their beliefs are characterized by wanting of a return of the 
sacred; which they believe are the answer to a two-folded crisis experienced in Muslim 
states; the normative opposition to the advancement of secular modernity, and the 
structural challenges related to failed development in many of the states (Tibi 2012: 2 
and 163-164). Islamists carry the concept of a transnational Muslims ummah, and how 
there should be a sharia-ran state where this could flourish. However, this sharia they 
mention is one of their own making. The religionized political agenda thus becomes to 
create a state which is inherently connected to the dream of a din-wa-dawla existing on 
the premise that the Islamist sharia is adopted as the only true set of laws, but this type 
of state has never existed in Islamic history (Tibi 2012: 30-33). Also, to give most of 
these Islamists the benefit of being thought of as rightful theological authorities seem 
to be somewhat untrue (Hasan 2014). 
For a more thorough read on the differences between the ideology of Islamism, the 
theological beliefs of Salafism and Wahhabism, and their relation to the Islamic faith, 
please see Tibi (2012) and Euben and Zaman (2009). 
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3.2 The History of Islamism 
3.2.1 Hassan al-Banna and The Muslim Brotherhood 
The modern version of Islamism is generally considered to have begun with the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, and the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 (Sørensen 
2012; Tibi 2012: 16; Hansen and Kainz 2007: 56). The Ottoman Empire was by many 
recognized as the last real Caliphate
2
, and when it was dissolved following the First 
World War, it left a vacuum in both the political and the theological world. The 
Muslim Brotherhood, al-Ihkwan al-Muslimum in Arabic, started with a goal of 
remaking a “true” Caliphate for all Muslims to live in, a state that would follow the 
law of Allah to the letter. The Brotherhood’s founder, Hassan al-Banna, was both their 
leader and their first ideological theorist. Under his leadership, the group started out as 
activists, with the aim of creating a new and pure caliphate in accordance to Islam, and 
spread out across the Arabian Peninsula.  
Al-Banna, originally a watchmaker and school-teacher, started his political life rather 
early. In 1919 he was active in strikes against the British rule in Egypt, and during his 
time as a student he frequently opposed Christian missionary activity in his country 
(Euben and Zaman 2009: 50). He graduated from Dar al-‘Ulum in 1927, and started 
working as an Arabic teacher. It was during this time that he started publically 
preaching about the necessity of reviving the true Islam. He was appalled by what he 
perceived as a materialistic and secular way of living that the British companies and 
soldiers living in the area had brought with them. The Muslims living there, he 
thought, had abandoned their Islamic virtue and adopted the Westerners moral 
decadence (Euben and Zaman 2009: 50). As such, he founded the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and worked through two decades until they had spread to almost all of 
the neighboring countries, both by preaching and by offering humanitarian help to 
those who suffered under the Egyptian regime. He established schools, brought 
                                                 
2
 A system of Islamic government led by a Caliph who was considered to be the political and religious successor 
of Muhammad, and therefore the leader of all Muslims. 
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electricity to villages, created health clinics and orphanages, and built mosques (Euben 
and Zaman 2009: 51). 
Under his leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood grew to be a major political power in 
Egypt. By helping the needy, they built up both goodwill and support among the 
Egyptian populace, and during the Second World War, al-Banna ran for office. After 
being pressured by Wafdi, the leading nationalist party, he withdrew his candidacy, 
but managed to pressure the government into easing up on the Brotherhood and restrict 
prostitution and the distribution of alcohol. However, a few years after the war, the 
relationship between the brotherhood and the state worsened to the point that the 
brotherhood established a secret apparatus in order to defend its members from 
government oppression (Euben and Zaman 2009: 52). From there, things quickly 
escalated: first the prime minister of Egypt, Nuqrashi Pasha, issued a proclamation in 
1948 which dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, for which he was 
assassinated by one of its members shortly thereafter. The next prime minister decided 
al-Banna was now a threat, and had him shot down and killed on February 12, 1949 
(Euben and Zaman 2009: 52). 
Through his work as a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Banna wrote letters and 
pamphlets where he diagnosed and concluded on many of the leading thoughts of 
Islamists today. He presented the West and its rise to power as a victory of the 
materialistic, and the epitome of moral bankruptcy. To oppose this corruption, he 
envisioned Islam as a way of life or a religio-political imperative to be followed 
(Euben and Zaman 2009: 52). The reason that Islam and Islamic countries were 
struggling socially and economically were because of the abovementioned western 
influence, but also because of the inability and helplessness of the current religious 
authorities. To him, the Muslim world was split in multiple camps by indifference and 
sectarianism (Euben and Zaman 2009: 52). He once said about the brotherhood:  
“Our mission is one described most comprehensively by the term ‘Islamic’, though 
this word has a meaning broader than the narrow definition understood by people 
generally. We believe that Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every 
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aspects of life, adjudicating on every one of its concerns and prescribing for it a solid 
and rigorous order” (Lia 1998: 75, cited in Sørensen 2012: 28). 
Furtermore, he argued that for the Islamic state to be reformed, a different approach 
than simply accepting the Western hegemony must be used. In his perhaps most 
famous piece of writing, the pamphlet “Toward the Light”, he wrote: 
“The leadership of the world was at one time entirely in the hands of the East, then it 
fell to the West after the rise of the Greeks and Romans. After that, the Prophetic eras 
of Moses, Christ , and Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon them all) 
brought it back to the East for a second time, but then the East fell into its long sleep, 
and the West enjoyed a new rebirth. It was Allah's Sunnah which does not fail to 
manifest itself and the West inherited leadership of the world. But lo and behold! It 
was tyrannical and unjust, insolent, misguided, and stumbling blindly, all it requires is 
a strong Eastern power to exert itself under the shadow of Allah's banner, with the 
standard of the Qur'an fluttering at its head, and backed up by the strong soldiers of 
unyielding faith; then you will see the World living under the tranquility of Islam, and 
on the lips of everyone will be the following slogan: 
“Praise be unto Allah who guided us to this. for truly we would not have been guided 
if Allah had not guided us”” (Euben and Zaman 2009: 59). 
Al-Banna urged the people and the leadership in the East to work together for the 
revival of the Islamic ummah. An allegiance to such an ummah would not be defined 
by territory or ethnic diversities, but by faith (Euben and Zaman 2009: 54). This was, 
to al-Banna, crucial, and he founded the Brotherhood as an instigating agent of 
bringing this change about. Perhaps the most interesting is the ending chapter of 
“Toward the Light”, where the Brotherhood lists their demands of the respective 
government and royal families. The list is split into three parts labeled “Political, 
judicial, and administrative”, “Social and Educational”, and “Economic”, and all 
together contains 50 suggestions of how a society and government should behave and 
function. The entire list can be viewed in Euben and Zaman (2009: 74-78), but I have 
chosen to highlight a few of them: 
“First: Political, judicial, and administrative: 
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1. An end to party rivalry, and a channeling of the political forces of the nation into a 
common front and a single phalanx. 
2. A reform of the law, so that it will conform to Islamic legislation in every branch.  
3. A strengthening of the armed forces, and an increase in the number of youth groups 
– the inspiration of the latter with zeal on the bases of Islamic jihad. 
4. A strengthening of the bonds between all the Islamic countries, especially the Arab 
countries, to pave the way for a practical and serious consideration of the matter of the 
departed Caliphate. 
5. The diffusion of the Islamic spirit throughout all departments of the government, so 
that all its employees will feel responsible for adhering to Islamic teachings. 
6. The surveillance of the personal conduct of all its employees, and an end to the 
dichotomy between the private and professional spheres. 
[…] 
Second: Social and educational: 
1.  Conditioning the people to respect public morality and the issuance of directives 
fortified by the aegis of the law on this subject; the imposition of severe penalties for 
moral offense. 
[…] 
14. The confiscation of provocative stories and books that implant the seeds of 
skepticism in an insidious manner and newspapers that strives to disseminate 
immorality and capitalize indecently on lustful desires. 
[…] 
26. Consideration of ways to arrive gradually at a uniform mode of dress for the 
nation. 
27. An end to the foreign spirit in our homes with regard to language, manners, dress, 
governesses, nurses, etc., with all these to be Egyptianized, especially in upper-class 
homes. 
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All these are examples both of what the Brotherhood believed was wrong about 
society, but also how they wanted to fix it. Along with these, the remaining claims also 
wanted to forbid dancing and to close “morally undesirable ballrooms and dance 
halls”, prohibit men and women from sitting together, to “instruct women in what is 
proper”, and in addition to the listed ban on books deemed unfit for society, examine 
and exclude songs, movies and lectures with potential immoral messages (Euben and 
Zaman 2009: 75-77). It was also the Brotherhoods prerogative to demand the complete 
rebirth of what they perceived was the Islamic way of living. Especially two requests 
are worthy of discussion: number 3 and 6. 
Number 3 states that Egypt should strengthen the military and increase the number of 
youth groups, and that these inspiration for such youth groups should be “on the bases 
of Islamic Jihad” (Euben and Zaman 2009: 75). This was not only to minimize the 
western influence and make it clear that Egypt were capable to run and defend itself, it 
was also a thorough solution on how to make the young of the nation grow up with the 
right set of mind. This control over what the young were taught to believe was also 
one of the main reasons for the Brotherhood’s expansion, as they implemented this in 
the schools and after-school activities they ran. 
Number 6 is another demand that is central in order to understand the Brotherhood’s 
view on government, Islam and social life. Everyone who worked for the government 
was to be put under surveillance in order to control and look after their behavior. He 
called for an “an end to the dichotomy between the private and professional spheres”. 
This might be a proposed solution to what he believed was corruption in the Egyptian 
government, but when you look at it with the other demands in mind, the picture 
changes. While fighting corruption is certainly an important thing to do, especially in a 
state like Egypt in the early 20
th
 century, it is also clear that this surveillance of 
employees will also serve a different purpose: to establish control and check for non-
Islamic behavior, like the one they are banning in the other points mentioned above. 
For al-Banna, the political stance of the Brotherhood was one of completeness. There 
is no in-between when it came to living in accordance to Allah and Islam. The answer 
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was what many refer to as a revivalist approach or a fundamental change from the new 
to the proven and good old (Utvik 2006: 148). The “perfect” way of life was how the 
Prophet Muhammad had lived, and society had to find back to these roots. These ideas 
would later be expanded upon by al-Bannas contemporary partner, Sayyid Qutb. 
3.2.2 Sayyid Qutb  
Sayyid Qutb is perhaps the most influential Islamist theorist of the early 20
th
 century, 
if not of all time. If al-Banna was the political leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb 
were their main ideological preacher (Euben and Zaman 2009: 129). He is one of two, 
the other being Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi who will be presented in the next part of this 
chapter, of which Bassam Tibi (1998: 28) proclaims to be the most prominent 
Islamists in history. Though he started out as a somewhat secular public worker and 
educator, his interest in Islam and politics fully developed after he spent two years in 
the US in order to study. This is where many attribute his change after he witnessed 
the American society and its frivolous, as he saw it, way of life (Hansen and Kainz 
2007: 57). When he returned to Egypt, he became an active member in the 
Brotherhood. 
Qutb wrote many influential texts and books that were read both by his contemporaries 
and people today. His magnum opus was his commentary on the Quran, “In the Shade 
of the Quran”, of which eight volumes have been translated into English. He also 
wrote shorter pieces like “Islam. The Religion of the Future” and “Islam. The True 
Religion” (Hansen and Kainz 2007: 58). Still, he is mostly famous for another book, 
published in 1964, which would go on to influence Islamist groups even today. 
 After being imprisoned by the Nasser-regime in 1954 for his alleged involvement in 
an attempt to take the life of the president, and where he was systematically tortured, 
Qutb started writing what would become the book “Ma'alim fi al-Tariq”, or “Signposts 
Along the Road”, more commonly known as “Signposts” (Euben and Zaman 2009: 
130). An alternate translation is “Milestones”, and both are frequently used. When he 
was finally brought to court in order to answer for his alleged murder-attempt on 
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Nasser, this book was frequently referred to as a part of the evidence against him, 
which ultimately made him a martyr to many conservative or fundamentalist Muslims. 
“Signposts” is split into 13 different chapters where Qutb makes his case both as to 
why the West and the Soviets are corrupt and is, by their political extension, 
corrupting the world with its global hegemony, and why Islam is the answer mankind 
need to avoid complete moral and corporal destruction (Qutb 2004). Indeed, the very 
first sentence in “Signposts” is “Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice”, and the 
first paragraph is dedicated to explain how humanity has lost the values one need to 
prosper, and that this is why they are now in decline (Qutb 2004: 3). He refers to this 
state of being as jahiliyya, meaning living in ignorance of divine guidance. The word 
jahilyya is taken from Islamic and Quranic traditions and may roughly be translated to 
“age of ignorance”, which is used to reference to the Arabic world pre-Islam (Hansen 
and Kainz 2007: 58). “Signposts” is still considered to be one the most important 
works for Islamists all over the world. Even to such an extent that it is compared to 
“Mein Kampf” and “The Communist Manifesto” in terms of ideological importance 
(Sørensen 2012: 182).  
Qutb’s greatest contribution was his complete analysis on how the world had gone 
wrong, and what the remedy for this should be. His beliefs were more or less the same 
as al-Banna, but Qutb’s talent for writing gave them a much larger impact on the civil 
society than they had had before (Sørensen 2012: 181). His view on the world was 
simple. Both the Americans and the Soviets, who he considers the most influential 
political and social powers at the time, are propagating two wrongful conceptions of 
society and its functions. Theirs was a world of decadence and material wealth which 
would only turn humanity to conflict and moral decay. To Qutb, both western liberal 
democracy and capitalism, and Marx’s communism were in decline because of their 
focus on material gains and expansion, as well as their godless and modern way of life. 
According to Qutb, only Allah could make laws, and any man attempting to make laws 
himself would be guilty of heresy, because he thought he could set himself on the 
same level as Allah (Qutb 2004: 8). 
37 
 
As such, Qutb envisioned and explained what he believed a society should look like 
and do. To Qutb, Islam, if interpreted and executed correctly, would usher mankind 
into a perfect state of being, as they finally would fulfill the divine mandate given to 
them by Allah through his prophet Muhammad He upheld the idea that only those who 
truly commit to Islam in their heart and soul will be honored with an acceptance into 
paradise after their death. This commitment to Allah would also save mankind by 
establishing the perfect worldly political system, as designed for man by Allah 
himself. The most insistent suggestions were to incorporate the set of laws from the 
Quran straight into the societies of Muslims, and to actively wage both physical and 
ideological war on the enemies and traitors of Islam (Qutb 2004: 32-38). Especially in 
his insistence of creating an ummah which lived under sharia in a purely as-is manner, 
can one see how his view of man’s involvement in lawmaking as one of a purely 
platonic relationship. There would, and could not, be any interpretation done on the 
Quran and its content, just acceptance of its laws as Allah’s will. This anti-revisionism, 
or anti-intellectualism, meant that he not only rejected the chosen enemies in Western 
democracy and the USSR, he also claimed all changes made to the understanding of 
the Quran, and fiqh, made the general Muslim populace and its ulama wrong. Any 
reflection on the correct understanding of the Quran would lead to discussion and thus 
away from the true objective, which is of a practical nature (Hansen and Kainz 2007: 
60). The word of Allah is to be read and carried out, not debated on. Only by accepting 
this truth, and by extension this as one’s role in life, would an individual become truly 
free. 
To Qutb, as is apparent when one reads “Signposts”, is that sharia, Islam, and Allah 
are truly perfect, and the basis of his ideology. As Hansen and Kainz (2007: 58) states: 
Qutb’s political ideology can be summarised [sic] in three steps: The starting point is a 
fundamental critique of the present conditions as a reversed world order, in which man 
is rejecting God’s laws (jahiliyya); the struggle between good (Islam) and evil 
(jahiliyya) is the driving force behind human history; the means to fight the currently 
prevailing jahiliyya is the jihad. 
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In the same vein as al-Banna, he arrived on the conclusion that the non-Muslims of the 
world should either be converted or destroyed. To him there were only two camps of 
people, or two states of being, one of the ummah which was to be the Muslims living 
in and for an Islamic state, and that of jahilyya, which were both sinners and enemies 
of the ummah. There is no in between. Thus, Qutb advocated a continued jihad against 
the world of jahilyya. Another thing Qutb presented was that this conflict with jahilyya 
was a “War of Ideas” between iman, which means belief, and kufr, which means 
unbelief (Tibi 2012: 8). He wrote in one of his pamphlets: 
“The battle between the believers and their enemies is in its substance a fight over 
religious dogma and absolutely nothing else. […] It is not a political or an economic 
conflict, but in substance a war of ideas: either true belief or infidelity is to prevail” 
(Qutb, cited in Tibi 2012: 8). 
This portrayal is the key to understanding the common ground between his two main 
descriptive ideas.  
Qutb’s views have been of major importance to many of the contemporary Islamist 
organizations. The reason for this is three folded: Firstly, his texts provided an 
intellectual justification for an extreme anti-Western sentiment on both a cultural and 
political level. Secondly, he provides a thorough reasoning for establishing an Islamic 
society based on sharia, and presents this in as a way of liberation for Muslims. And 
thirdly, he justifies a overthrowing of all of the world’s governments, also those 
controlled by Muslims, by the means of a holy war or struggle (Zimmerman 2004: 
223).  
As such, Qutb influenced many groups and organization beyond Egypt and the 
Muslim Brotherhood. One example is Ayman al-Zawahiri, who founded the terror 
organization Tanzim al-Jihad, also known under the name Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an 
organization which fought against Nasir’s secular pan-Arabism, before he fled to 
Pakistan in 1985 (Hansen and Kainz 2007: 57). Another is the infamous leader of Al-
Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, who studied at the University of Jedda in Saudi Arabia, 
where he was a student of Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb (Hansen and Kainz 2007: 
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57). A third who adopted his world view was Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj. 
Inspired by the writings and ideas Qutb represented, Faraj published his famous “The 
Neglected Duty” in 1977, which urged Muslims to privately and individually engage 
in jihad with the ultimate goal of creating a worldwide Caliphate (Baran 2004:8). 
3.2.3 Abul Ala Mawdudi  
Abul Ala Mawdudi is the other main Islamist theorist, according to Tibi (1998: 28). He 
was an Islamic scholar, imam, and the founder of the political party Jamaat-e-Islami in 
Pakistan, a party that is still active today (Sørensen 2012: 176). Mawdudi’s view on 
Islam and society was one of in which the two was inseparable. He was convinced that 
the true application of Islam was to incorporate it into a full Islamic State, where the 
religious laws were the same as the state’s law. Such an Islamic State would show the 
world how perfect Islam was, and be a pinnacle of “human well-being” (Sørensen 
2012: 176). To Mawdudi, this was what the Prophet Muhammad himself had created 
when he first assembled the first generation of Muslims. He wrote that the goal of 
Jamaat e-Islami was establishing and witnessing to the totality of Islam (Sørensen 
2012:176). 
Mawdudi is responsible for many of the main points as to how this Islamic state would 
be. First, the society would be based on a firm and shared belief among the subjects, 
and not fragile and random factors such as race, skin color or existing boundaries 
(Sørensen 2012: 177). The Islamic state would be a state where the residents chose to 
be, and where they lived following a contract with Allah. Second, this state would 
follow the Islamic sharia in its complete form. This is a central point regarding how 
Islamists picture their ideal state. Mawdudi claimed that it is man who understands 
sharia wrong when he debates certain points of it on a case by case basis. Sharia is a 
complete set, and must be followed as such. To him, this was the fallacy of other 
Islamic nations and communities. True sharia was all the laws, but also all the 
responsibilities. For example, if someone steals, sharia dictates that the person’s hand 
is to be cut off. This, however, would only be the case in the fully developed Islamic 
society where the Islamic State already provided its citizens with the basic necessities 
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they needed, the wealthy paid the obligatory tax that would go to the poor, and so on. 
In this society, there would be no need for thievery. A person who still chooses to 
steal, not to survive, but for greed, must be punished harshly (Sørensen 2012: 178). 
This would also be true for other crimes, such as adultery. Punishing someone for 
having sex outside of marriage, or cheating on one’s spouse is, according to sharia, 
punishable by a hundred lashed for someone who is not married, and stoning to death 
for someone who is married. Such punishment would only be applied in a true Islamic 
State, where public festivities for men and women were illegal, and women were not 
painted and brought out to the pleasures of the crowd (Sørensen 2012: 178). He 
continues on this in a very similar vein to al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, by 
claiming that his society would not contain any of nude pictures, vulgar books, songs, 
and movies. When people where not living in what he referred to as “filthy societies 
where sexual frivolities were flourishing”, they would not need to be unfaithful or 
ruled by lust, and as such, sharia would control their behavior (Sørensen 2012: 178-
179). 
He disagreed, however, with Qutb on how this state should become reality. Mawdudi 
believed that Muslims should first try to establish an Islamic state within their own 
territories, by peaceful persuasion. He stressed that the implementation of the political 
principles laid down in the Quran required a state structure, and that this Islamic state 
will be a precursor to the Caliphate (Osman 2010: 602). Nonetheless, he also defended 
the use of violence and physical struggle through jihad, but only in regards to 
situations of “oppression” and where there were identified “true enemies of Islam 
(Sørensen 2012: 180). The primary way of achieving the Islamic State must be trough 
creating it from inside. 
One last thing that differentiated Mawdudi from Qutb, was that he accepted the 
existence of other minorities within the Islamic State. Where Qutb saw the world of 
jahiliyya as one who could never exist alongside the true Muslims, Mawdudi 
reluctantly proclaimed that minorities would be both accepted and permitted to live by 
their own customs. It is, however, debatable how much freedom they would have, and 
exactly how they would be allowed to coexist in his Islamic State. They would have to 
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follow the law of sharia if this was the law of the state, and they would have no power 
over the government of the land if the Muslims were in majority (Sørensen 2012: 180). 
Still, this acceptance of non-Muslim minorities are in a somewhat opposition to Qutb’s 
total rejection, and shows that even in an Islamist discourse, there is a theoretical 
tradition for the possibility of a non-Islamic community in the Islamic State. 
Where al-Banna problematized the influence of the West and the need for Islamic 
revival, and Qutb defined the world of jahiliyya and Islam as one of pure conflict, 
Mawdudi were the one to influence Islamist with regards to how the ideal society 
would be. His ideas of the totality of the state, the responsibilities it has under sharia, 
and so on laid the theoretical foundations for how Islamists today claim their proposed 
Caliphate will look like. Mawdudis analysis of sharia is also one of the foremost 
influences as to its inherent perfection, according to Islamists, if it is fully incorporated 
as a system of law. 
3.3 The Ideological Components of Islamism 
To understand what Islamism contains is to understand the arguments and proposed 
solutions of the theorists presented in the last chapter. All of them laid the groundwork 
for what we today refer to as one ideology. Building on the definitions of Mozaffari, 
and Euben and Zaman, I propose the following ideas to be the central components of 
Islamism, and thus the main beliefs I will look for when analyzing the Prophet’s 
Ummah: 
(1). The belief that the contemporary Muslim world is decadent and has fallen 
out of touch with its true religious calling because of a civilizational and 
ideological war with other cultures, particularly the West. 
(2) Sharia law, akin to the one the Prophet Mohammad and the first generations 
of Muslims was presented with, must be the guiding set of rules for both 
religious, political and social life. 
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(3) The need for establishing, or re-establishing, a true Islamic State 
(Caliphate), ruled in accordance to the aforementioned sharia, for Muslims to 
live in and promote Islam as a perfect system. 
(4) It is the duty of all Muslims to make this happen, and to implement the will 
of Allah in their lives. Those who do not promote or struggle for this are not 
true Muslims. 
These four contains all of the previously mention views made apparent by al-Banna, 
Qutb, Mawdudi, and Faraj. The descriptive parts of the ideology are that of how the 
world is today, and who is responsible for this state of affairs, both of which I have 
included in the first component. Here, the central belief is that Muslims themselves 
have detached themselves from the true spirit of Islam, and adopted traditions and 
ideas from kufr. This is where the blame lies with both the current Islamic theological 
leadership, which promotes a peaceful partnership with other cultures. Furthermore, 
the influence from other civilizations are imperialistic in character, whether it has 
come as a result of lost wars or other physical confrontations against imperialist states, 
or through a theoretical war of ideas, where Islam is forced to adopt non-Islamic 
customs and traditions. It is nevertheless the believed case that Islam has turned away 
from Allah’s will and guidance by changing or otherwise not live up to his plan for 
mankind. 
This leads us over to the second component, that which relates to sharia and how it is 
used in modern day society. I will spend some time discussing this aspect, as it is 
perhaps the single most important component. This is because it is the main normative 
argument made by Islamists: that to live in accordance with sharia is to live in both 
religious and political perfection. Sharia is generally considered to be guidelines as to 
how a Muslim should live; indeed the very name translates to “the path” or “the way”. 
It includes both rules and practices for marriage, economics and criminal law, and 
instructions on how a Muslim should behave in matters of spiritual and moral nature, 
such as praying (Marshall 2005:1). Thus, to Muslims, the way westerns speak of 
sharia as only including the stoning of adulterous women or cutting the hand off 
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thieves, sound rather strange and faulty. Sharia has several different schools, multiple 
theological understandings, and is not, as many believe, a universally agreed upon set 
of laws and regulations all Muslims must adhere to (Tibi 2012:160).  
Islamist has taken Qutb’s stance on the influence of jahilyya to demand a complete 
return to what they perceive to be a perfect state of Islamic sharia; that which the first 
three generations of Muslims lived by (Euben and Zaman 2009:19). This is where 
Mozaffari’s “holistic interpretation” and Euben and Zaman’s “return to the scriptural 
foundations” are the key words of choice. To Islamists, sharia must be taken in full, 
without alteration or restructuring. They adopt Qutb’s words of a totality of perfection, 
that while it might not all make sense when debated word for word, the completeness 
of it, and how it works when executed in fullness, is how Allah himself meant it to be 
used. This “extreme” version of sharia rejects all other schools of law who has 
evolved through the centuries in favor of what they believe is a “pure” version (Tibi 
2012: 158-161). Any alteration to sharia is an attempt to be better than Allah, and that 
is one of the highest forms of heresy. This interpretation states that the only sharia 
worth recognizing is the sharia defined and used by the first, second and third 
generation of Muslims (Mozaffari 2007: 22-23). They adhere to a sharia they believe 
is pure and unaltered. Modern day schools of sharia, they claim, are influenced by 
Western philosophers and judicial tradition. Through the centuries, this influence from 
other cultures and religious practices has warped what was the original intention of the 
law; being a set of divinely instruction as to how society and human life should 
function. This is non-negotiable. Sharia was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad as a 
complete and finished set, not something meant to be interpreted and changed by 
“mere” men (Qutb 2004: 95-101; Marshall 2005: 1-6). 
The Islamist version of sharia is the one applied by the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
multiple international Islamist organizations such as Al-Qaida and its supporters, is 
close to what Marshall (2015) refers to as the Wahhabist-sharia. The Wahhabist-
sharia is to some extent incorporated in Saudi-Arabia, as the royal family has been 
closely allied with the Wahhabist movements. Although they have, in the more recent 
years, liberalized some of their policies, especially regarding women, they still hold 
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true to the interpretation of sharia as absolute. Stoning of adulterers and gays, for 
example, is a common occurrence, often publically (Schwartz 2005: 95-101). While 
Saudi-Arabia is rejected as a true Islamic State by Islamists because of their close 
cooperation with the West, they do represent a version of law that Islamists want to 
implement. This type of sharia is more or less the case of how the law has been 
practiced in the newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. IS has posted both 
videos and pictures of themselves online where they carry out this type of justice, 
often citing the Quran and sharia directly while carrying out their judgement. So when 
Islamist talks about sharia, it is this sharia they are the closest to talking about. 
The third component is the proposed solution to the problems mentioned in 1, which is 
necessary in order to execute and maintain the perfected sharia, no.2. This is also what 
Tibi (2012: 31) believe is the conditio sine qua non of Islamism. The return of the 
Caliphat is to Islamists of crucial importance, as it serves both as a revival of Allah’s 
perfect system for mankind, and the instrument to show the world the entirety and 
perceived perfection of Islam (Tibi: 31-33). This state is also where the Islamists show 
their approach to the world dominion of their ideology, since the state here is not one 
of mere boundaries as states are usually defined. This is the state of the Ummah, which 
transcends race, nationalities, and other such human inventions (Tibi 2012: 32-36 and 
39-45). The Islamic state will happen the way Islamists want it to happen, follow the 
law they want to implement and so on. It is the epitome of Islamist achievement. 
The fourth is the struggling, of which is generally referred to as jihad or jihadism. 
However, I have chosen to use the word struggling rather than fighting. This is 
because temporary Islamism is split when it comes to the understanding of the place of 
jihad. Some agree with Qutb, that jihad is in essence a necessary violent struggle, 
while others still claim that as long as one can achieve one’s goal, the struggling can 
both be peaceful and within the current system. How a group views this is not the 
deciding factor of whether they ought to be called an Islamist group or not, but it is an 
interesting variable to note, not only because of its practical importance when dealing 
with such groups, but also because it show the different incarnations of Islamists 
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theory in practice. As the next part of this chapter will show, this is the source of the 
major disagreement between contemporary Islamist groups. 
To conclude on this, Islamism is in essence a gathering of the following beliefs: The 
main descriptive ideas of Islamists are that the world, and especially the Islamic parts 
of it, is suffering because they have turned away from Allah and his sharia. They have 
done this because there is an ongoing war, both physical and ideological, between 
Muslims and kuffar. This, together with the normative idea that people should live by 
sharia as it was presented and preached by Muhammad and his first generation of 
Muslims, leads to their practical solution of reviving and recreating an Islamic state. 
This state will follow sharia to the letter, and therefore be a perfect utopian for 
mankind. Different types of struggle, or jihad, i.e. both violent and non-violent, are 
acceptable in order to bring this state about.  
3.4 Islamism today 
In the last decades, groups, organizations, and political parties that fall under the 
umbrella of Islamism have continued to thrive, though they have become more 
diffused in how they operate. Islamism is today used to explain and define everything 
from pure terrorist-organizations like Boko Haram in Nigeria to the leading political 
party in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). These Islamist have more 
or less used Qutb, al-Banna and Mawdudi as ideological forbearers. Mawdudis vision 
of an Islamic state, together with al-Bannas insistence that both the poor conditions of 
Muslim states and the infidelity he witnessed were brought to them by the West and 
other foreign influences, have been the stepping stones of which they accepted Qutb’s 
argumentation that the solution was to be found in a religionization of politics, and the 
fulfillment of a true din-wa-dawla free from the influence of jahilyya. From this, 
hundreds of groupings, organizations and parties have emerged building on these ideas 
as a set of common denominators.  
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This part is meant to give a short introduction to some of the current Islamist groups 
that exist today. This is to give the reader a basis for comparison when we look at the 
Prophet’s Ummah.  
However, what Qutb, Mawdudi and al-Banna represents is the background for what 
we today call Islamism, not everything it entails. As Sørensen (2012: 174) points out: 
ideologies and political organizations are not static. They change, adopt different 
priorities, reacts to whatever internal or external stimuli they face, or go through other 
such alterations. What the aforementioned theorists put into place was the grand ideas 
of Islamism: al-Banna with his analysis of the Muslim world as decadent and 
westernized, and as such had left the path of Islam of which they ought to follow; 
Mawdudi’s wanting of a true Islamic State where Islam and sharia was given both its 
rightful place and followed to the letter; and Qutb with his portrayal of an ongoing 
conflict between jahilyya and the believers, a conflict of both a physical and 
ideological character which could, and most, be won through the collective action of 
jihad and the fulfillment of the Muslim dogma. Before we move on to the Prophet’s 
Ummah, I want to present a few other incarnations of Islamist groups and 
organizations, to serve as both a point of reference, and as examples of different 
diverges within the ideological family. 
Most of the various incarnations of contemporary Islamism can roughly be divided 
into three divisions, dependent on how they organize themselves, and how they view 
the appropriate use of sharia and jihad. Some, like AKP in Turkey, the international 
Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, or the current Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, are 
mostly operating in political parties or interest groups within democratic or semi-
democratic systems, trying to influence the general populace through official public 
channels. To them, sharia law can be imported into legislation more or less through 
the current system of political structure. They usually adopt a conservative stance on 
societal manners, but generally abide by governmental rules and procedures. They 
reject jihad through terrorist attacks and other violent forms, but support to some 
degree or another civil disobedience (Vidino 2015: 7-11). 
47 
 
On the other end of the scale we have the various terrorist-groups operating around the 
globe. These can be violent insurgents like Boko Haram in Nigeria, or a larger network 
of both large and small groupings with a central leadership like Al-Qaida. To them, the 
founding of an Islamic State, one completely without non-islamic influence, can only 
be a reality if the current political system in the country or part of the world of which 
the group operates is completely re-written. This is the group that has taken Qutb’s 
views on the separation of the ummah and kuffar to be of crucial importance. In order 
to rid the Muslims of foreign interference, one has to defeat and remove any 
constellation of what they perceive is non-Islamic. They might be doing this because 
of purely ideological reasons, or because of some external action that has forced the 
group into physical confrontations. 
The third, and final, type of are pure non-governmental organizations, such as 
Islam4UK or Sharia4Belgium in Europe, which present themselves as interest groups 
on behalf of a religious view, or sometimes even as self-proclaimed religious entities. 
Though they are all referred to as Islamist, there are many differences between both 
the divisions mentioned here, and within-group variations. Such groups are what 
Vidino (2015) tries to explain in regards to their relationship with the two other 
classifications mentioned here. These groups are often treated as a springboard for 
people wanting to join the more extreme organizations, such as al-Qaida or the Islamic 
State. This is also the type of group the Prophet’s Ummah is claimed to be a part of, 
being neither a registered political party nor an NGO (Vidino 2015: 5). There are quite 
a few similarities between the how these groups operate and how they fit in with the 
ideology of Islamism, and the divisions between them are not always clear-cut. For 
example, Islam4UK and the different Sharia4 groups have meetings with each other 
and invite guest speakers and lecturers from both each other and from third party 
organizations.  
I have taken the liberty of including a short overview (Table 1) of how different 
Islamist groups and parties relate to the abovementioned ideological components. The 
data here is a summarized version of various studies done on the particular groups. 
The sources of the various groups are as follows: the Muslim Brotherhood’s views are 
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from Tibi (2012: 16-18 and 205-209) and Trager (2011); al-Qaida from Sørensen 
(2012: 211-219); Hizb ut-Tahrir from Sørensen (2012: 211-219), Osman (2010) and 
Karagiannis (2013); Islam4UK from Vidino (2015); AKP from Tibi (2012); ISIS/ISIL 
is from Cronin (2015). 
 
Table 1: Ideological components in Islamist groups today 
Group Islam under 
pressure 
War/Ideological 
Islamic State Sharia Violent 
Jihad 
Muslim Brotherhood Yes, ideological Yes Direct No 
 
AKP (Turkey) 
 
Yes, ideological 
 
Yes 
 
Inspired
1
 
 
No 
 
Hizb ut-Tahrir 
 
Yes, ideological 
 
Yes 
 
Direct 
 
Partially
2
 
Islam4UK Yes, both Yes Direct Partially 
Al-Qaida Yes, both Yes Direct Yes 
ISIS/ISIL Yes, both Yes Direct Yes 
1
 Sharia as theoretical basis for all other law, but not a literal adoption 
2
 Partially refer to those who defend the use of violence as sometimes necessary in jihad, without doing it 
themselves
  
 
What is particularly interesting is how these different Islamist parties and 
organizations view the use of jihad in order to achieve their goals. This is because of 
the inherent ambiguity of the term, and how it can be used to describe both an internal 
and external form of struggling or fighting, as described in 3.3. Parties who otherwise 
have accepted Qutb’s visions and arguments about the necessity of actively opposing 
jahilyya are more often than not opposed to include actual warfare or physical 
confrontations. Let us take, for example, the cases of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Al-Qaida. 
Both reject the secularity and modernity of the West, both work for a political state 
with sharia as a de facto constitution, and yet, they have a complete opposite view on 
the legitimate use of violence in order to further such aim. While al-Qaida has become 
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perhaps the most infamous terrorist-organization in history, and has declared even 
civilian targets as part of the conflict, Hizb ut-Tahrir operates more or less peacefully 
within Western societies, even going as far as condoning the violent actions of other 
Islamist groups, even though they share many of the sentiments. Even more difficult to 
pinpoint with regards to how they perceive violence as a part of jihad are groups like 
Islam4UK or Sharia4Belgium (Vidino 2015). Before they were banned in 2012, 
Islam4UK were led by Chaudry, an anti-western preacher who has defended the use of 
terror against the western military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and even 
defended the murder of Bill Bygsby in London. Still, they never committed anything 
more extreme than the burning of the American flag themselves. Their support to 
violent jihad was purely vocal, though this vocal support seems to be more than 
enough to gather young men and women to their organization (Husain 2009). 
These differences between parties, organizations, and NGOs, however, must not be 
mistaken for the groups or collectives wrongful placement by others under the 
umbrella of Islamism. While Al-Qaida and AKP are very different organizations, they 
are still Islamist, because their goal is an Islamic State ruled by the aforementioned 
Sharia. Now, it is time to see how the Prophet’s Ummah fits into all of this. 
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4 The Ideas of the Prophet’s Ummah 
In order to answer my thesis, I have decided to divide this analysis in a few different 
parts. First, I will answer whether or not the Prophet’s Ummah contain the core beliefs 
of an Islamist ideology at all, and how they are presented by the group. These are the 
ideas identified in chapter 3 “Islamism”. It is somewhat difficult to establish these 
major overarching ideas in a correct chronological order, because they are so 
intertwined with each other, but here, they will be analyzed in the order they appear in 
the previous chapter. 
I addition, I have included some of the more specific views of the group. I do this 
because most of these overarching normative and descriptive ideas will have a great 
influence on other underlying views and opinions the group holds, and it makes for an 
easier reading if these are mentioned in relation to its greater context, rather than as a 
single piece of information. This analysis will have little discussion about the points 
and what they mean, this will be covered in the next chapter. When citing a text or 
comment, I have chosen to highlight the important parts in order to make it easier to 
see the points of interests. All text presented here are of my own translation. 
4.1 On Islam and the World 
This first belief is split into two parts, one where we deal with the idea of a physical 
and ideological war on Islam from the non-believers, and the second one that other 
Muslims have removed themselves from true Islam they are supposed to follow.  
1. The Islamic world is under siege from non-believers  
This is the core identifiable belief held by Islamist groups, and the Prophet’s Ummah 
is no different. This is a descriptive idea which identifies how the group believes the 
world of today works. In most of their press releases, the group explicitly states that 
they regard the non-Muslim world as enemies of Allah and the true Muslims. I 
mention this first because it is crucial to remember it when examining the other parts 
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of their ideology. It is because of this belief that they see the need to change the world 
(to follow sharia), and why they have chosen the method (jihad/jihadism) of doing so.  
This idea of Islam being under attack is something Ubaydullah Hussain talks about in 
his interview with VG (Kleivan et. al 2014). Here, he is asked questions primarily 
about the Islamic state and the group formerly known as Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The interviewer wants to 
know what Hussain thinks about all the people fleeing the then newly formed state 
being peoples of other religions, such as the Yezidis, Shia-Muslims, and Christians, 
when Hussain explicitly has stated that such people would be under the protection of a 
true Islamic State. Hussain answers: 
“I will tell you one thing: In the world today, there are two groups of people. We have 
the Muslims, who submit themselves to Allah, and believe that authority/sovereignty 
belongs only to Allah, and we have the infidels, be they Yezidis, or whatever religion 
they have; who believes that authority/sovereignty belongs to man and man-made 
laws. Of course, there is an ongoing global fight against Islam and Muslims, a 
global war, ideologically and military. It is not something new that the West use 
propaganda such as this… that women are being killed, that children are being killed 
[by ISIS]”. 
After being pushed on the point by the journalist, he continues for a while talking 
about how Yezidis, Christians and Jews are allowed to live in the Islamic state as long 
as they pay jizya, a form of tax imposed on non-Muslim residents in an Islamic state, 
according to old Muslims customs. However, when asked about whether or not the 
Prophet’s Ummah was responsible for a car driving around in Oslo shouting pro-
Islamic State slogans, Hussain continues on his views of the world today: 
“It ought to be said that we Muslims are a peaceful people. We do not wish murders, 
we do not wish war, but we must defend ourselves if we are attacked. If you look at 
the world today, as it is today, then Muslim lands are occupied, Muslims are being 
massacred, being jailed, and tortured without judgement or trial in various 
countries. There is a global war against Muslims. We see in China where the Chinese 
are fighting Muslims. We see in Chechenia how communists are fighting Muslims. 
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We see in Burma where Buddhists are fighting Muslims, we see in Palestine where 
Jews are fighting Muslims, we see in Iraq and Kashmir where Hindus are fighting 
Muslims, and we see too this crusade against Islam and Muslims in among others 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, not to mention the drone-attacks who happens daily in 
North-Pakistan, Yemen and other Muslim Countries” (Kleivan et. al 2014). 
To Hussain, this war of cultures seems to be one in which Muslims are on the 
receiving end of a great injustice. While he, and the rest of the Prophet’s Ummah, 
usually reserve their direct animosity for the West, it is clearly a more global 
phenomenon of Islam vs the rest than something solely between Western and Arabic 
nations. His references to various other conflicts indicate that he believes that an anti-
Muslim attitude is transcendent of other inter-cultural conflicts, i.e., while other 
nations or cultures might disagree on a many features of international politics, they 
agree that Islam and Muslims are to be made victims or scapegoats. Thus, Islam exists 
under pressure from all sides, in a world bent on destroying them. Hussain also 
upholds that other cultures treat Muslims inherently different than others, and that they 
do not extend to them the same rights they do other peoples; they are exempt from 
basic human rights, for example, in being denied a trial when charged of criminal 
activities. When writing about foreign policies, the group states that:  
“The Prophet Muhammad established in his time basic rights for prisoners of war, 
which are what one would call real human rights in contrast to today’s so-called 
human rights or the Geneva Convention which does not apply to Muslims as has 
been revealed in Abu Graib, and which continues today in among other Guantanamo 
Bay” 
Furthermore, in another press release the group calls out to the American president 
Barack Obama to:  
“give up on the despicable war they are waging on Muslims and Islam. [The Muslims] 
wants their land back so that the flag carrying their creed can once again fly without 
the meddling of the heathen pigs”(Profetens Ummah 2013A). 
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Especially the last part here is of note. In most other texts, the Prophet’s Ummah refers 
to their portrayed enemies as either “infidels” or “imperialist”. Other times, they 
simply speak of kuffar which lives in the world of jahilyya. While this is the only 
example of a pure dehumanization of their perceived enemies, it is interesting when 
combined with how Hussain, in his interview, are very keen on explaining that they 
pose no threat to people of other religions, as long as they accept the law of sharia and 
pay their jizya. More on this later, in the chapter: “On Sharia”. 
Another point the Prophet’s Ummah is adamant about is that the Norwegian general 
populace, through their government and media, is a part of this war on Islam. 
This belief of a war against Islam is not one made simply about the general affair of 
international politics, but also something that is applicable to a more local level. The 
Prophet’s Ummah expands upon this war to be something that everyone takes part in, 
because of the governments they elect. In my examples, they mostly refer to the 
Norwegian populace, but the criticism in question is also applicable to other non-
Muslim societies. For example, during the time when some of the Norwegian media 
speculated about internal problems and fighting within the group, the Prophet’s 
Ummah released the following statement: 
“The Prophet’s Ummah will with this press release refute the lies that the Norwegian 
media has published in the later weeks about the group’s disbandment. We do not 
expect anything else, as they are a part of the crusade against Islam and Muslims. 
Media, the Police, and the government will do their outmost in order to split the 
Muslim population” (Profetens Ummah 2013C) 
In yet another titled “Our dear brother – Arfan Bhatti”, they refer to the American 
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 as an “assault”, and states that the prime minister 
at the time, Kjell Magne Bondevik, “Waved enthusiastically when the Norwegian jet 
fighters took off to bomb refugees, wedding receptions, and funerals” (Profetens 
Ummah 2013D).  
The same text also proclaims that the former Minister of Defence, Kristin Khron 
Devold: “… behaved like a young girl in love when she met Donald Rumsfeld, the 
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man who approved the use of torture, and let perverts and sadists have their way with 
prisoners”. Norway is also specifically mentioned, along with the USA and Great 
Britain, in their text “Utenrikspolitikk” (Foreign Policy) as countries behind a brutal 
modern warfare (Profetens Ummah 2013E).  
1b. This siege is also one of foreign ideology and traditions being forced upon 
Muslims from non-Muslim sources; a “War of Ideas”. 
This concept of a siege on the Muslim world by others is also one of theological and 
theoretical nature, which falls in under what Bassam Tibi (2012: 8-10) refers to as a 
“War of Ideas” often held by Islamists. The Prophet’s Ummah relates to this especially 
in two of their texts labeled “Vestlig Utdanningssystem” (The Educational System of 
the West) and “Islamsk Utdanningssystem” (The Educational System of Islam) 
(Profetens Ummah 2013F; Profetens Ummah 2013G). In the first text, they state that 
the way education is handled today is in “direct opposition” to what Allah teaches you 
with regards to f. ex. evolution or thermodynamics. They also claim that under the 
Western system, the children will be taught that Islam is unimportant, and believe that:  
“Islam will be taught as a religion which degrades and oppresses innocents” 
(Prophet’s Ummah 2013F).  
Following this, according to the PU, schools are also guilty of misinformation:  
“[in] your child’s religious studies-class, Islam will be considered an equal to 
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism etc…” (Prophet’s Ummah 2013F).   
From this, we can infer that the Prophet’s Ummah believe that not only will children 
not be taught what is “right” or in accordance to Allah’s will, but they will be given a 
false impression, interpretation, and understanding of both the religion of Islam and 
the importance of other cultures and theological beliefs relative to Islam. Nevertheless, 
it might be safe to say that they reject any education which does not uphold their own 
belief of Islam as above other religions. 
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When explaining how their own system would look like, they voice their opinion on 
how the current educational system in Muslim countries is controlled by the West, and 
thus why it needs to change:  
“In the future Islamic State, schools, institutions and universities who has been 
established and ran by the foreign imperialists and their agents, like Aitcheson 
College, Lahore; St. Joseph’s School, Dhaka; St John’s Institution, Kuala Lumpur etc. 
will be closed. These are institutions that are deliberately sat up to implement young 
Muslim with non-Islamic ideas meant to show them the greatness and honor of the 
Western way of living” (Profetens Ummah 2013G).  
To the Prophet’s Ummah, it seems, the educational system, as it works today, is one of 
imperialist origin with regards to the Islamic world. Young Muslims are believed to be 
victims of Western propaganda through their education, and thus made subservient of 
a non-Islamic way of thinking and living. Furthermore, this war of ideas is also 
intentional: 
“And after the collaps of communism and socialism and after the so-called democracy 
had completely failed, so the only threat against their human-made laws, their human-
made ideas, their human-made ideologies, that is sharia” (Profetens Ummah 2014C) 
He also, in the same video, claim that the only reason USA intervened in Somalia, was 
so that they could stop Islam, the only remaining threat to the West and their ideas. 
This leads us to the other part of the first component: 
2. This influence has led to Muslims no longer living in accordance to Islam 
According to the Prophet’s Ummah, there are quite a few ways this ideological and 
physical war on Islam has led the religion away from its roots. First, consider this 
passage from a text labeled “Islamic Law” 
“The last remnants of the Islamic State were in fact demolished by the British and the 
French in what is today called Turkey, March 3rd, 1924. Countries such as Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran are in reality far away from full sharia, despite what many 
believe. In reality most of these countries, including all the Arabic nations, has 
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been strongly influenced by Western terms like democracy and freedom/liberty. 
This was forced upon them by Western nations like the US and Great Britain. These 
nations, together with other European nations, entered Muslim countries in a campaign 
of violence, threats and murders. They have tried hard to eliminate Islamic knowledge 
through the murders of hundreds of thousands of Muslims and their scholars” 
However, when it comes to the denouncing of other Muslims, they are less public 
about the theological side of the debate than they are about the more practical side. 
While the group itself claims to be Salafist, they speak mainly about what this means, 
and seldom attack others, though one example is this, which is a statement from one of 
the members: 
“The ideology of Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden derives from the Quran and the 
teachings of the Prophet. (…) A person who differs from these beliefs differs from 
what the Prophet and the Quran taught him. Every Muslim is obliged to work for the 
liberation of an occupied territory. If they don’t, they are all sinners.” (Holmer 2014: 
22) 
This simply implies that all who do not follow the teachings of Al-Qaida, Bin Laden, 
and, one would assume, Anwar al-Awlaki, as he was the one who wrote most of the 
theoretical work in Al-Qaida. One of the few instances where they do declare other 
Muslims who does not agree with them as failures, is in their previous Facebook-
group, where they debate IslamNet, another conservative youth group considered 
Salafist (Akerhaug 2013: 214). The following texts are both posts on that group, as 
well as e-mails sent to Islam.net, who write a couple of articles about them:  
«IslamNet invistes and has invited speakers who denies the obligation of Jihad, and 
who are servants of kuffar in their manahej [an Islamic methodology], unknowing that 
their manhaj is in servitude to shaytan [Means: the Devil] and the West about 
separating Islam from the political [parts]. We don’t takfeer [sic] on these “ulama” 
because they are […] useful idiots for kuffar, unknowing that they are working [the 
Wests] agenda.” (IslamNet 2013) 
Mohyeldeen Mohammed continues in another post: 
57 
 
“Enthusiasts of IslamNet; What good has your despicable fitna-sect done for Ummat 
Muhammad […]? Your cult destroyed Khalifah, your cult split the Muslims, your 
cult spreads fitnah and hatred between Muslims, your cult is a messenger for 
kuffar and wants to see all Muslims subdue themselves for kuffar. I wonder how 
the followers of this jadidiyyah-cult will answer for themselves on the Final Day” 
(IslamNet 2013) 
Fitna means trial, and can be used to describe a time of strife or civil war. The 
implication here is that Islam.net is contributing to an inner conflict in Islam. The 
interesting choice of words here, though, is how much blame is being put on IslamNet 
for the status of the Islamic world today. While I won’t go into details about the 
religious views of IslamNet, it is mainly conservative, and yet it seems like that is 
exactly why Mohyeldeen believes them to be one of the reasons for Islam’s decline. 
Being held accountable for spreading civil strife and hatred between Muslim, and 
claimed to be messengers for kuffar speaks for a complete hostile attitude to what is 
one of the largest religious youth group in Norway. For more on the debate, the full 
text is available at Islam.net (2013). 
This rejection of other Muslim groups are also apparent in the video “Al Wala wal 
Bara”, which they published on YouTube (Profetens Ummah 2014C). Here, they claim 
that the Norvegian government is trying to enforce the war of ideas by corrupting 
Islam: 
“And that is why the Norwegian government has founded so-called Muslims 
organizations to work against radicalism, against extremism, against a literal 
interpretation of Islam. Against the full Islam as it is practiced and exposed […] by 
Mohammed. And that is why we today have organizations like Minotenk. False 
organizations that gets a pat on the shoulder from the Norwegian government, [and] 
bills and coins in their pockets. Why? To change Islam’s authenticity from inside. […] 
We find so-called wise imams, who work for democracy. Who work in order to 
promote man-made laws, ideologies and ideas. And we find mosques, who invite 
members of the government to hold speeches so they can spread their twisted man-
made ideologies and ideas”. 
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Minotenk is a Norwegian think-thank supported by the government to both study and 
help minorities in Norway. One of their advisors is a previous member of the 
Prophet’s Ummah. Clearly, they are not considered to be representing the true Islam, 
only a fabricated version in order to get grants, and are also branded as traitors out to 
change Islam into something else. 
One last note on the relationship between the Prophet’s Ummah and other Muslims is 
that they consequently refer to Muslims in general when talking about themselves. 
Both in their internal and external discourse, they always speak about “What Muslims 
want”, and “We Muslims must”. This is especially noticeable in their texts on 
theprophetsummah.com and VG’s interview with Hussain (Kleivan et. al 2014). As for 
what it means, it is simply a continuing of what Tibi (2012: 7), and to a certain degree 
Holmer (2014) encounters when dealing with Islamists: They truly believe themselves 
to be “real” Muslims, and fighting for what all Muslims should be fighting for.  
2b. Democracy is a part of this war and a practice of shirk. 
The proclaimed “War of Ideas” has led countries away from Allah, by influencing 
them to accept democracy as a type of government. They continue on expanding upon 
this point of view in another text labeled shirk, which is an Islamic term for the sin of 
practicing idolatry or polytheism, by saying that: 
“One of the most manifested and openly used form of shirk today is the presence 
of human made laws, which is a direct insult to Allah’s monopoly as the Lawmaker 
[sic]. Therefore, it has been custom to obey and follow laws and regulations made by 
humans instead of following Allah’s sharia. 
The Muslim society has been manipulated to participate in democracy, by 
implementing laws and regulations that goes against sharia or seeking judgement from 
arbitrators who does not govern from sharia. As such, they refer their problems to the 
United Nations and Nato. […] 
It is therefore important that we give the right [to be the only lawmaker] back to Allah 
by establishing Allah’s laws on this earth. No Muslim shall recognize anyone but 
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Allah as the Lawmaker [sic]. […] As such, we Muslims cannot be manipulated to 
accept anything that might lead to Shirk”. 
Again, the Prophet’s Ummah has identified that Muslims have been systematically 
taught to turn away from the “true” Islam, and manipulated into accepting human rule. 
To the Prophet’s Ummah, any Muslim who confers with state officials in democratic 
countries or obey laws not coming directly from sharia, are committing shirk. The 
blame lies with non-Islamic interference with both the schools, but also with the 
secular traditions adopted from democratic societies. It is interesting to note that PU 
refers to democracy as manipulating and inherently wrong, and therefore making all 
Muslims who participate in election, whether they simply vote or run for office, as 
committers of shirk. Even simply living here has been deemed unfit for Muslims 
according to the Prophet’s Ummah, as they declare Norway as dar al-kufr, meaning 
“the land of the infidels” (Akerhaug 2013: 89). 
3. The world is split between the believers and the non-believers 
In a video of Mohyeldeen Muhammad published on YouTube by the Prophet’s 
Ummah on November 12, 2012, allegedly filmed in Syria, he directly addresses the 
Norwegian people and government: 
It is not us Muslims who are the uncivilized barbaric terrorist, but yourselves who are 
barbarians, unclean, uncivilized and godless creatures, who together with your allies 
have terrorized and oppress innocent Muslims since the fall of the Islamic Khilafah. 
You are infidel kuffar, the worst of all creatures who walks this earth. […] and let it be 
known, that the Islamic ummah is an ummah of victory and honor. An ummah of jihad 
and martyrdom, who will never bow or given in to your evil, unfairness, and falseness. 
There are no compromises between us and you. Your barbarian civilization and 
democracy has no place on this earth. 
 
To conclude this part, I have summarized the most important ideological components: 
a) The true Islamic State and the original Muslim beliefs, have been demolished by the 
West and its war on Islam, b) contemporary Arabic nations are not working in 
accordance to Islam because this influence, and c) opposing true sharia has been one 
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of the main goal of the West in their crusades against the Muslims. This leads us to the 
second component, sharia. 
4.2 On Sharia 
1. Sharia must be the guiding set of rules for religious, political, and social 
life. 
This is the second major identifier of an Islamist group, and again, the Prophet’s 
Ummah are adamant in their conviction that this is true. This belief is more or less 
split into three: the descriptive view of today’s society as one of failure, the normative 
view that living in accordance to sharia would rectify this failure, and the proposed 
solution of applying sharia directly into society for all to follow. Let us begin with 
how the Prophet’s Ummah view the current world: 
“We see men who struggle to find and earn enough for their daily bread. We see that 
the suicide rate is rising, criminal activity rises as the prisons are overcrowded. Rapes 
and drunken fighting happens every weekend and crimes related to drugs are 
happening daily. Women are abused by being treated as objects or sold as 
merchandise. Children grow up in unstable homes because of adultery in the family or 
as witnesses to divorces between parents. These are only a few of the problems 
befallen the western societies.” 
This view of the world is something they mention in quite a few of their other texts. As 
pointed out on their view of “Islam and the World”, this is what they believe 
democracy and human influence on the laws of Allah lead to. Because of shirk and the 
failure of today’s societies to adopt Islam as presented by Mohammad. This is a 
statement the Prophet’s Ummah makes when explaining why they believe the world 
has gone awry. To the Prophet’s Ummah, the solution to this is clear: 
“The Western governments are struggling with finding solutions to their societal 
problems, but these problems will always be there because the solutions to human 
made problems comes from the humans <…> Allah (SWT) has through the Prophet 
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Muhammad (fvhm) given us the perfect solution to all our problems and this is a 
mercy for mankind” 
The basic belief here is that sharia is a divine contraption given to Muhammad by 
God, and thus both infallible and unchangeable. This is shown most explicitly in one 
of their texts on their website named “Sharia”, where the Prophet’s Ummah accounts 
for what the laws are, what they are meant to be, and how they should be carried out in 
practice (Profetens Ummah 2013B). It should still be noted that Sharia here will be 
treated as what the Prophet’s Ummah believe it to be.  
“[Sharia means] oasis or the way to the water; a place in the dessert where one would 
find water to survive. In Islam it means a divine way of living, a way of living that 
Allah wants us to live by. Man needs sharia in his life to function and survive just 
as one needs an oasis in the dessert to survive.”  
<…> 
“As Muslims we are obliged to follow and live as decided by Allah. Sharia is the law 
of which every single Muslim must follow in all aspects of life. Sharia must regulate 
the public and the private aspects of all Muslims lives.” 
For the Prophet’s Ummah, sharia is both the path itself, and a reason for the 
completeness of their political beliefs. 
“Sharia is not only beheadings and cutting off hands, it is a lifestyle, it is how an 
individual person should be in life, how a family should be in life, how a society 
should be”  
The crucial part here is that to them, sharia is the perfect answers to all possible 
criticism of their ideology. If only it were to be incorporated into human life 
completely, its perfection would be shown. Therefore, when asked about specifics 
regarding their ideal society, the answer is in itself that all problems would be solved 
by sharia. They write: 
“Sharia is the only solution for the unfairness that has struck the world because this 
system would remove the problems by their roots. Allah (SWT) sharia fulfills your 
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basic needs like food, shelter, and clothing. <…> Sharia offers free healthcare, gives 
you free gas and electricity, forbid infidelity, forbid alcohol, forbid the practice of 
homosexuality, and forbids everything that might end in corruption or create 
corruption. Loans are allowed, but not interest. Sharia has an alternative and a 
solution to all problems. These are only a few examples of what sharia can offer the 
West.” (Profetens Ummah 2013B) 
As such, they adopt the same approach to the fulfillment of sharia as Mawdudi does. 
This leads us to the second view on sharia: 
2. Sharia must be applied in full for it to be perfect. 
 
This is the portrayed reason for sharia’s failure in other Islamic states, according to the 
Prophet’s Ummah. They claim that sharia does not punish thieves harshly when they 
demand to cut off their hands, because sharia’s fulfillment of their basic needs. This 
will be further examined under the part about the Islamic State, but he says this during 
his interview with VG: 
 
“… and you will not be punished [if the] Islamic state [cannot] see to your basic 
needs. Your basic needs are food, healthcare, shelter, gass, electricity and so on. […] 
but when it comes to cutting, that is, cutting of the hands when someone steals, then 
there are guidelines. It has to be above a certain value, a certain sum. Food, if you steal 
food you are not punished, and so on. So there are guidelines for this. It is not like a 
person in the street can start stoning a homosexual or start cutting the hands off 
someone who steals. There is a court, a sharia court, and the case must be brought 
before it”. (Kleivan et. al 2014). 
This belief in sharia as both Allah’s will and command runs deep, and thus, it is 
unquestionable. Akerhaug (2012: 78) asks a member of the group, “Samir”, how he 
feels about the stoning of adulterers: 
“Sex outside of marriage is punishable by a hundred lashes. But, if the person who has 
sex is married, the punishment is death by stoning. […] What I want, that is something 
else. It is about what sharia and Allah wants. Islam is not about what I think. It is 
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not about whether I really want anybody stoned [to death]. It is what Allah wants that 
count.” 
As an extension on this, the Prophet’s Ummah also claim the following: 
3. Governance under Sharia should be applied for all of humanity 
That is to say, they believe sharia to be the true solution to everyone, everywhere, for 
all time. This builds into their belief of sharia not as a simple collection of rules, but 
something of the sort of a new world order. While this is also mentioned in a previous 
cited paragraph, they mention it a couple of times more. As they put it in “Sharia – 
Islamsk Lovgivning”: 
“It should be noted, however, that Sharia is not limited to Muslims, but the laws and 
regulations given to us by Allah was sent to the whole of mankind” (Profetens 
Ummah 2013B) 
This is expanded upon when Ubaydullah Hussain (cited in Skoglund 2014: 49) himself 
posts on his facebook-page: 
“Our goal is to live in a world ruled by sharia-law, and where the black flag with 
[our] creed flutter above Stortinget [the Norwegian Parliament], Buckingham Palace, 
The White House and all other places. Every Muslim is obligated to want to live under 
Islamic law, and let the laws of Allah be the only ones. […] Islam has come. To rule 
from east to west, and north to south. And we will not stop until our goal is reached. 
My generation, the next or the one after that. With the help of Allah!”. 
With this, they set the stage for the coming of the Islamic State. 
4.3 On the Islamic State 
The affirmed goal of the organization is the creation of a world-wide Islamic state. 
This state will be both the sanctuary Muslims must have to live their lives in full 
accordance with Allah, but it is also important for all of mankind as a perfect system 
of societal and religious endeavor. Prior to the summer of 2014, this was an expressed 
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goal of the Prophet’s Ummah, but with the founding of the Islamic State by the former 
ISIS/ISIL, the group rallied their support behind this instead. However, we are not 
going to treat the Islamic State of ISIS as concrete Islamic state the Prophet’s Ummah 
envisioned, that will be a point for the discussion to follow. Let us first see how they 
themselves perceive this imagined ideal state. 
1. The creation of an Islamic state is necessary 
It has briefly been implied above that the Prophet’s Ummah believe a state or multiple 
states using the aforementioned sharia as a basis for all law, must be established. This 
is an expressed goal of the organization. From Hussains facebook-page (cited in 
Skoglund 2014: 49):    
“Khilafah [the Caliphate] will be established today or tomorrow. […] For this 
generation has awakened. We are not greedy for materialism or [the Wests] other 
goods like some of the Muslims in the generations before us have been. We are 
greedy for the establishing of Khilafah”.  
This is also apparent with their acknowledgement of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq 
as the Caliphate they were waiting for. When the news of its founding became known, 
the Prophet’s Ummah celebrated. This is from his interview with VG, and is his 
answer when asked whether or not the Prophet’s Ummah supports the new Islamic 
State: 
“I think most Muslims in Norway and around the world support and Islamic 
State. It is obligatory for a Muslim to work for an establishing of Islamic law 
wherever we are. And now that we have finally gotten an Islamic State after 90 years, 
then it is the best place for us to live, where we can practice our religion in full, where 
our honor and safety is protected by the state” (Kleivan et. al 2014). 
They have also published a video on Youtube with the title “Gledelige Nyheter”, 
(Happy news), which is a few seconds of a young girl citing the Quran, followed by a 
song celebrating the Islamic State and proclaiming that the “Infidels will lose”, “the 
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glory of religion will return” and “This is a Caliphate and an honest promise from 
Allah” (Profetens Ummah 2014B). The movie ends with a young boy saying that: 
“The Islamic State is making victories in Iraq, Syria, and everywhere. […] We’ll destroy 
the enemies of the religion, all who fought the Islamic State and the Caliphate. The 
Caliphate will remain until the end of the world, and God willing, we will fight for 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi”. 
The last panel is a message in blue and white on a black background: “The Prophet’s 
Ummah congratulates all Muslims with the reestablishing of the Islamic State”. 
2. The Islamic State will be ruled in accordance to Allah and his Sharia 
This has already been briefly mentioned in the two previous chapters, so here, I will 
only express what the Prophet’s Ummah believe the State should be providing and 
how it would work if the aforementioned sharia were in place. According to the group, 
the state has multiple obligations to the public, if it is to be considered in accordance 
with their sharia. From the text “Det Islamske Sosial Systemet [sic]” (The Social 
System of Islam):  
“[The Caliphate] is comprised of divine laws (sharia) which have been unaltered for 
1400 years after their revelation. It is a guide to how we should behave, not only in 
public, but in the private sphere as well” 
Ubaydullah Hussain expands upon this in a video posted on Youtube labeled 
“Gyldigheten av Khilafah” (The Validity of the Caliphate), where he explains why the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is a legitimate Caliphate (Profetens Ummah 2014D). He 
lists five necessary points for a state to be considered a proper Caliphate: 
The first is that sovereignty, adoration, and lawmaking is for Allah alone, and the state 
must accept this.  
The second is that all law must have their source in sharia. They must all be from the 
Quran or Sunnah. This, he says, is why they do not accept Saudi Arabia as a legitimate 
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Islamic State; they have laws regarding interest on loans, which is forbidden. A leader 
of the Caliphate must only rule by sharia, not decide things himself. 
The third is that the authority and control of force and borders are under the control of 
Muslims. One cannot have a true Islamic State if the police or military are including or 
under the control of kuffar. Allah will never allow kuffar to have authority over 
Muslims. 
The fourth is that there can only be one Caliphate. Here, he refers to a saying from 
Muhammed, available in the video, and said that there cannot be two states who call 
themselves the Caliphate, and if another is appointed or elected, one must be killed or 
destroyed. The Caliphate must be the only one for the Ummah. 
The fifth and final point is, according to Hussain, that the leader of such a state must 
be absolute. When he decides, one must follow. There will always be differences in 
opinion, but what the Caliphate decides most be accepted. The only time one could 
refuse this, is if the Caliphate orders something that goes against sharia, the Quran, or 
Sunnah. Thus, I would like to add this point: 
2a. The Caliphate is ruled as a non-democratic, authoritarian regime. 
Though neither the group, nor Hussain explicitly refers to the Islamic State as an 
authoritarian regime, it is heavily implied both in the text referred to above, how they 
talk about the democratic system of government, and in how they have accepted Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi as the legitimate Islamic Caliph of the Ummah (Profetens Ummah 
2014D; Kleivan et al. 2014). Discovering more on this point should be a priority for 
the further research on the group. 
2b. The Islamic State must provide basic necessities for all its residents. 
Furthermore, under «Sannheten om Islam», they express an addition to the relationship 
between sharia and the state: that the Islamic state would fulfill all of the inhabitants 
needs, by directly make the basic necessities available to all. As mentioned in one of 
the quotes under “On Sharia”, it is mandatory for a State operating by sharia to 
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provide its residents with free healthcare, free gas and electricity, as well as their basic 
needs of food, shelter and clothing (Profetens UmmahX 2013). Because of this, their 
belief that this is for the good of all mankind is absolute. From “Sannheten om Islam” 
(Profetens Ummah 2013I): 
“[Islam] is the only system which fulfills and honors the basic necessities of its 
citizens (food, shelter and clothing), offers free healthcare, free gas and electricity, 
forbids narcotics and punishes criminals justly, and gives out loans but forbids 
interest.” 
And in “Utenrikspolitikk” (Foreign Policy): “Only the Islamic State can create true 
peace on earth and stop the world’s economic and social problems” (Profetens Ummah 
2013E). The state would also provide free education for both men and women 
(Profetens Ummah 2013G).  
The Prophet’s Ummah’s stance on sharia and the founding of an Islamic state is of 
course the most important aspect on how they believe society should function. 
Nevertheless, they also do proclaim some direct views and beliefs about what exactly 
this would entail. Here, I have listed all suggestions made by the Prophet’s Ummah 
with regards to the running of the state and the application of governmental matters. 
3. The economy of the Islamic state is a market economy with Islamic Fiqh 
The Prophet’s Ummah has dedicated an entire site on their webpage, in order to 
explain how the economy would work in their Islamic state. These beliefs are taken 
from their text “Økonomisk system” (Economical System). 
The overarching idea is that all resources that mankind need is created by Allah, and 
he alone has given humans permission to use these (Profetens Ummah 2013H). They 
list four points of reasoning about how the economy should function: 
-  Individual work is of the most importance, and Islam accepts this in its ethics. 
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- Everyone is expected to earn their keep through their own work. A person’s 
own work is the only legitimate foundation of obtaining material goods and 
wealth. 
- Neither an individual’s skills nor natural resources should be unused, and it is 
forbidden to waste or squander resources given to mankind by Allah. 
- Even so, money obtain through halal (permissible) methods should not be used 
to only maximize a person’s wealth; luxury is frowned upon. To give back to 
one’s community is encouraged. 
The Prophet’s Ummah seem to be leaning towards an individualistic system of 
economy, where one’s wealth will be the results of one’s work. To quote them once 
more: “There is no doubt that one of the obligations a Muslim must live with, is that he 
earns for himself and his family in a pure and halal business” (Profetens Ummah 
2013H). In addition to these, they adopt the usual Islamic tradition of making interest 
on loans haram (forbidden) (Profetens Ummah 2013H).  
If we compare this to their view on an Islamic States responsibilities, the economic 
system they seem to adopt is one not unlike the various welfare states featuring mixed 
economy throughout the world, with some additions as to what the state is responsible 
for. 
3a. Jizya must be paid by non-Muslims in order for them to live in the Islamic 
State, and this will grant those who do rights and protection 
This is one of the actual Islamic rules that are founded in Islamic traditions, but have 
been more or less abolished by Islamic countries today. It has, however, been 
reinstated in the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. According to the Prophet’s Ummah, 
any Christian or Jew who pays this tax will be able to live in the Islamic State. Hussain 
says: 
“[The non-Muslims] are given three choices: [convert to Islam], or they have to pay 
jizya, a type of tax. This tax is very low, […] this tax is 0.5%. We Muslims pay 2.5% of 
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our wealth to the poor, so this is only a symbolic sum, and it makes it so that Christians 
and Jews and other religions, they gain the protection of their lives, their honor, their 
religion and their wealth from the Islamic State. […] women, children, the elderly, those 
who are of bad health are exempt from paying this tax”. (Kleivan et. al  2014). 
4. Slavery, if it follows an Islamic code of conduct, is permitted 
This is perhaps the single most interesting practical suggestion the Prophet’s Ummah 
has proposed. In two videos posted on Youtube through their official channel, Hussain 
appears and speaks about slavery in Islam (Profetens Ummah 2014A; Profetens 
Ummah 2014B). Here, he argues that slavery, when implemented correctly, is 
perfectly in accordance to Islam, and thus a way of obtaining a service. He claims that 
one must not compare this to the slavery that the West conducted during the colonial 
times and in the pre-civil war US. Slavery in Islam would be the result of two things: 
either a man sold himself into slavery to clear a debt, or the slaves were the women 
and children of the enemies of Islam that were left after the war was over. These 
women and children would be taken in and cared for by a Muslim man, who could not, 
under sharia, treat them in a bad manner. Hussain says:  
“… when you add the people who wage war against muslims, who war against Islam, 
those who do not want peace, those who do not pay jizya, those who want to kill 
Muslims, those who ally themselves with enemies of Islam, then the Prophet has given 
permission to take them as slaves after the war.” 
He continues to state that Mohammad originally had three ways of making someone a 
slave, but only one of them was legitimate today: to take the surviving women and 
children after the Muslims had won the war against kuffar. 
“The only way you can make someone a slave in Islam is if you defeat an enemy in 
war. What do we do with the women and children? For it is not like they are not 
participants/accessories in the war.” 
The taking of slaves thus becomes a solution to the problem of having wives and 
children of their previous enemies in the Islamic State. It, according to the Prophet’s 
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Ummah, both keep them starving or otherwise have to live in poverty, and gives the 
conquerors a mean of controlling any potential uprising in the future. Hussain says 
nothing about what type of slavery this would be. He does, however, continue with 
explaining why this form of slavery is different from what one would normally think 
when someone says slavery. Islam and sharia will care for the survivors, and will live 
as “full members of the family”. It is prohibited to strike or otherwise hurt a slave, or 
to give them too much work. It is permissible to take a female slave as one’s wife, but 
not a male.  
“And this is what the concept of slavery in Islam is about, that you treat slaves as your 
family. They are in the category of slaves, but they are treated like your own family. 
That you have authority over them, but also see to their necessities” 
While I have not seen this point or idea being expressed by any other Islamist group in 
Europe, it has been reported that this kind of slavery is common in the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria. 
5. Teaching subjects that goes against the teachings and practices of Islam is 
forbidden 
On schools, as was mentioned under the “War of Ideas” previously in this chapter, the 
Prophet’s Ummah holds that all subjects taught in school must follow the teachings of 
the Quran. More precise, they claim that when a Muslim delivers his child to a school 
in a non-Islamic state they are taught: 
“… many of these ideas which are taught in [science class] is in direct opposition to 
the Islamic faith. The theory of evolution say man evolved from monkeys. The 
principle of conservation of energy states that energy is eternal (cannot be destroyed or 
created, only change). Man is put in the same category as animals (only a more 
advanced). The circulation of water is presented as a self-sufficient system” 
All these ideas are false, the Prophet’s Ummah claims, because they go against the 
belief that Allah created men and the earth, and that he appointed men to rule it. 
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In an Islamic state, however, education would be both different and better, they 
believe: 
“While science in the West see [itself] as in opposition to God, it will in the Islamic 
State be a confirmation of the existence of Allah. The Child will come home and 
explain that he/she has learned everything about the circulation of water. How Allah 
makes water rise as steam from the oceans and become clouds, then Allah will make 
these clouds rain on land, and Allah will collect the rainwater and lead it back to the 
sea to begin the cycle anew. Nothing that is taught will be in contradiction to 
Islam” (Profetens Ummah 2013G) 
They also provide examples of what classes would be taught. Among them is 
“Humans from the apes, or from Allah?”, “An exposure of the fallacies in evolution”, 
and “the Big Bang theory vs Islamic reality”. The Islamic State has a mission of 
teaching what Allah is, and how the world works in accordance to the Islamist 
consensus on scientific facts and theories. 
5a. Homosexuality and blasphemy is punishable by death. 
These are the two main expressions of what would constitute a defined punishment 
presented by the Prophet’s Ummah, though there are certainly many more that the 
group has not been questioned about. I mention these especially because they represent 
two separate occasions in which the Prophet’s Ummah has openly declared their point 
of view on anything other than the primary aspects of Islamism. The first happened 
under the preparations for Gay Parade in Oslo (Barth-Heyerdahl et.al. 2014), the other 
after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, a satirical magazine who printed drawings of the 
Prophet Muhammed (Byrkjedal and Hopperstad 2015).   
6. The state has strict rules on marriage and the roles of men and women 
Again, this might be mostly because of a religious stance on the matter, but it is still a 
big part of how the Prophet’s Ummah believe the daily life in the Islamic State should 
be. This is their answer to the perceived social problems, as mentioned in the 
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beginning of this chapter, that of teen pregnancy, failure to help the young and the 
elderly and so on (Profetens ummah 2013I) 
They do have a special way of presenting their views, though. In their rhetoric, there is 
little focus on concrete individual rights, and more of what is expected of their 
citizens. The way they speak about marriage and gender is interesting because there is 
no women’s “rights”, only “roles”. From one of their texts (Profetens Ummah 2013J): 
“Islam has defined roles that men and women should follow in life, and has given 
them detailed guidelines for the relationship between the two. The social system in 
Islam is compatible with human nature, and there is no room for men or women to 
abuse or discriminate each other. Therefore, instead of a war between the sexes, there 
is peace and harmony. Both fulfill their roles, he as a man and she as a woman”. 
The purpose of an Islamic state is in this regard to help men and women behave and 
live in accordance to what Allah meant for them. To go against what Allah said is 
heresy. 
4.4 On Jihad 
The last part will be a quick review of how the Prophet’s Ummah sees the necessity of 
jihad. Jihad here is translated to struggling in order to avoid any confusion, but as will 
be clear in the paragraphs to follow, the Prophet’s Ummah use the word to mean 
predominantly an active and physical struggle. The Prophet’s Ummah view on jihad is 
more or less summarized by Ubaydullah Hussain in the following citation: 
“It is compulsory for every Muslim to support jihad. The Prophet Muhammad, 
peace be upon him, said that a Muslim who dies without the intention of carrying out 
jihad, dies in a state of hypocrisy. Therefore, every Muslim is obliged to support jihad, 
whether it is militarily, whether it is verbal; by speaking against those who suppress 
Muslims, or economically; through welfare, strategy, and so on.” (Ubaydullah 
Hussain, cited in Holmer 2014: 4) 
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This means that we confirm that the Prophet’s Ummah believes jihad to be an external 
form of activism, and a mandatory one. This tie in with the first part of the fourth 
component of Islamism: 
1. It is the duty of Muslims to struggle for the establishing of the Islamic State 
This is further emphasized in the single largest contribution to the Prophet’s Ummah 
website prior to its deletion; the translated pamplet of Anwar al-Awlaki (2009) “44 
Ways to Support Jihad”. As the title implies, the text is 44 points of recommendation 
from Awlaki on how to properly support mujahedeen, which is an Islamic term for 
“holy warrior”, in the fight against kuffar. It covers anything from praying for the 
warriors, to taking care of their family, or to learning Arabic. While I will not go into 
the entirety of the list, I have selected a few of the points he make: 
- Praying to Allah to award you with martyrdom 
- Finance a Mujahedin 
- Fighting the lies of the Western Media 
- Raising our children on the love of Jihad and the mujahedeen 
- Learning skills that would benefit the mujahedeen 
- Boycotting the economy of the enemy 
- Translating Jihad literature into other language 
The list thus includes practices which all people from all social statuses can be a part 
of. The weak or old, for example, may pray for them or translate their literature, while 
the rich and resourceful must contribute to the campaign, with money, medical aid, 
work against the propaganda of their enemies etc. 
This is a part of Awlaki’s introduction that the Prophet’s Ummah has translated to 
Norwegian: 
“Jihad is the greatest deed in Islam and the salvation of the ummah is in practicing 
it. In times like these, when Muslim lands are occupied by the kuffar, when the jails of 
tyrants are full of Muslim POWs, when the rule of the law of Allah is absent from this 
world and when Islam is being attacked in order to uproot it, Jihad becomes obligatory 
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on every Muslim. Jihad must be practiced by the child even if the parents refuse, by 
the wife even if the husband objects and by the one in debt even if the lender 
disagrees. […]Again, the point needs to be stressed: Jihad today is obligatory on every 
capable Muslim. So as a Muslim who wants to please Allah it is your duty to find 
ways to practice it and support it”. 
Though this is the direct translation of another person’s work, it is not the only source 
that this view is held by the group. When asked if he supported terror against the US, 
he answered that “I support the Muslims right to defend themselves” and “in war, 
there are two parties [who wars], and they [the US] must expect retribution when they 
war against Muslims” (Kleivan et.al 2014). The group also states in one of their press 
releases that: 
“Afghans should be given control, a choice of government and sovereignty. If they do 
not, our holy jihad will intensify and continue, even if foreign soldiers are in our 
country, and this fight will continue until our people’s ambitions are fulfilled.”  
Furthermore, the Prophet’s Ummah have defended all of the most recent attacks in 
Europe as a part of the ongoing war between Islam and the West. He has also declared 
that: 
“All countries that participates in war, aggravation, and insults towards Islam is in a 
precarious position […]. That is why we have encouraged Norway to pull out their 
armies from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to stop the sale of weapons, 
ammunitions, bombs and drones to countries who are in war against Muslims” 
(Byrkjedal and Hopperstad 2015). 
From their website, they have a couple of press releases celebrating the actions of 
various mujahedeen. One in which they call a terrorist attack killing 20 policemen for 
executed by “a fearless, martyrdom-seeking mujahid […] May Allah accept his 
martyrdom and reward him”, another where they write a “heroic mujahid […] 
executed a martyrdom attack” in which 14 people were killed (Profetens Ummah 
2013K; Profetens Ummah 2013L).  
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There is little doubt that the Prophet’s Ummah believes jihad to be both necessary and 
required. The jihad they preach is also primarily offensive and external. They believe 
the fight for the Islamic State warrants this type of violence, since it is all done in the 
name of Allah. Their support for groups like Al-Qaida and ISIS further confirms this. 
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5 Discussion 
Through the previous chapter I identified the various beliefs held by the Prophet’s 
Ummah with concern to the greater ideological specter of Islamist thinking and 
tradition. Through this theoretical framework, and by comparing the group to other 
likeminded organizations and parties, I have arrived at a couple of point I believe are 
worthy of discussion. This chapter should be read as a complementary commentary to 
the previous; as a summary in which the various findings are put into a more thorough 
discussion. By drawing upon the analysis, we can come to some conclusions regarding 
the bigger picture of what the Prophet’s Ummah really represents. 
First, the Prophet’s Ummah adopts a Qutbian understanding of both the current world 
and the necessity for change. They believe that the world we live in is thoroughly 
corrupt, and must change. To the Prophet’s Ummah, Islam and the Muslim community 
is currently under siege from the non-Islamic world, especially the West, in both a 
physical and a theoretical way. Muslims are being threatened because of their beliefs 
all over the world, denied human rights, and generally repressed. This is particularly 
apparent in his interview with VG, and in the video “Al Wala wal Bara”. To the 
Prophet’s Ummah, there is also no question about how this war on Islam is both 
intentional and total. These are two key terms when we define their descriptive ideas 
of the world.  
The war is intentional simply because they believe all the ills that have befallen the 
Islamic community are of non-Muslim origin, or the work of traitorous Muslim in 
accordance to non-Muslim wishes. This is somewhat based on their religious belief of 
an almighty god who has given his final instructions through his prophet: If the 
instructions are here, the believers are certain, and the path is determined, then how is 
it still an un-perfect world? The Prophet’s Ummah believes that the answer is that 
Muslims have failed to incorporate the full system of sharia, the dream of din wa-
dawla, because of this ongoing war on Muslims. The intention of other civilizations is 
to oppose the Islamic. The rejection of the truth of the Prophet is directly linked with 
conflicts between the Muslim world and the other parts. The true intention of the other 
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civilizations is either the direct destruction of the Islamic truth, or the indirect 
changing and subjugating of Allah’s message. This is why, according to Ubaydullah 
Hussain, sharia has been targeted for destruction, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. 
The totality of the war is the other key term in this respect. “Totality” here is taken to 
mean that to the Prophet’s Ummah, there is only the conflict between Islam and the 
others. The world is divided in two; one of the believers, and one of jahiliyya. The 
physical war on Muslims is simple and observable, and should therefore be clear to all 
to see. The theoretical application of jahiliyya is something more sinister. The 
Prophet’s Ummah believes that almost everything that the Muslim community is 
taught in school, see on TV, and practice with regards to a Westphalian understanding 
of nation-states is a lie, or a cover-up for the ideological attack on the ummah. From a 
theological perspective, they believe this war has changed the way Islam is understood 
and practiced. This is where they cross beliefs with Salafists and Wahhabis: The 
wanting of a return to the sacred foundations of sharia and Islam as practiced by the 
pious forbearers.  A return of a true ummah is impossible unless one disregard the 
different evolutions that Islam has gone through, evolutions that have often been 
orchestrated by the West and other enemies. From a political perspective, this boils 
down to the rejection of pretty much all ideologies and views of governmental 
practices. The rejection of a separation of religion and state is absolute. 
For example: through western influence, the Muslim public has been exposed to, and 
forced to live with, shirk through non-Islamic beliefs and practices. Particularly 
offensive to the group are democracy and the acceptance of other religions and 
traditions. Democracy is shirk because it takes the power to make laws away from 
Allah, and puts it in the hands of humans. Man-made laws are an affront to the divine. 
Only Allah’s laws must be implemented. Ideologies like socialism or communism are 
also wrong, simply because they are inferior to the guidance of Allah. The point of the 
war, however, is to convince the Muslims otherwise. It is in this regard he follows up 
when presenting the groups rejection of other Muslim organizations, which have fallen 
in the trap of their enemies by accepting their way of thinking and doing. IslamNet and 
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Minotenk accept the governmental grants of kuffar. Imams preach against the use of 
jihad against their enemies. Muslims accept democratic conventions. This is, to the 
Prophet’s Ummah, a direct affront to what Islam and the Caliphate truly is. 
To the group, the contemporary world is also seen as evidence of this. Hussain refers 
to the state of the world today as one of failure. As one that is morally despicable, 
unjust, with poverty and hunger, and so on. This dystopian view only reaffirms the 
group’s beliefs in the necessity for a remake of the world order. 
This leads us over to the normative views of the group, as well as the practical 
solutions to the abovementioned problems. These are intertwined in the group’s 
discourse: the normative is simply the statement that all people should live in 
accordance to Islam and sharia, and the answer to these moral and practical problems 
lies in the establishment of an Islamic State, ruled through a particular interpretation of 
sharia, the Quran, and Sunnah. Working towards this goal, i.e. any form of jihad, is 
acceptable within the framework of these three sources of Islamic law. 
Let us start with the group’s normative idea of sharia. Here, they also comply with the 
general theory as presented by Qutb. The basic belief here is that sharia is a divine 
contraption given to Muhammad by God, and thus both infallible and unchangeable. 
Man needs sharia to survive. In this, it is also implied a concept of freedom, where a 
person would be truly living in full because the laws are a representation of his, and 
the rest of humanity’s, true self. The Prophet’s Ummah takes the concept of sharia as 
a de facto instruction manual on how to live. However, it is a particular brand of 
sharia, thanks to the war of ideas that have taken root in the Muslim communities. The 
group frequently refers to sharia as something unaltered through the times, which 
means they reject almost all of the different interpretations that are prominent in the 
Islamic world. This would necessarily lead to them having an alternative. However, 
apart from the obvious reference to the Quran, they do not promote exactly what they 
define sharia 
 to be. Not one place in all their texts and videos to they explain the finer points of this 
system of law and moral code. Their text “sharia” is one third a discussion of how the 
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world is wrong, one third a rejection about how the rest of the world define sharia, and 
one third of praise for what sharia would bring to mankind. The implication here is 
that it is simply believed to be perfect. Though I would not want to make this last part 
of my thesis one of criticism, it is a mere observation that when it comes to sharia, the 
Prophet’s Ummah takes much for granted, and only touch upon what such a system 
would truly be and look like. They clearly want sharia to instruct religious as well as 
political and social life, but they do not give any indication as what this might mean. 
Adding to this is their previously mentioned rejection of the different schools of 
sharia. If it is not according to these, then which sharia are we following? If the 
answer to this is the sharia as mentioned in the Quran, then why does not the 
Prophet’s Ummah expand and publish these ideas? Is it because of a missing 
consensus among the members? These are questions that would need to be answered 
in further research. Though the normative part of their ideology does not suffer much 
because of this, their practical solutions do, and therefore their whole argumentation of 
an ideal type of state would need to hinge on more than an undefined theological 
belief. Because of this, I find that while the Prophet’s Ummah does fit with the 
component of sharia as a normative idea of Islamism, it is at the same time an 
unknown when it comes to its practical application within society. 
This takes us to the third component of Islamism, the wanting to establish an Islamic 
State. Again, this is a perfect fit for the Prophet’s Ummah with regards to the 
theoretical background. The Caliphate must be reestablished, and it must be ruled 
according to sharia, the Quran, and Sunnah. It must work as an authoritarian state, 
with the aims of spreading and in the end controlling, the entire world. Again, 
however, the Prophet’s Ummah is unclear on how, exactly, this would come about. 
Here, I would like to bring in the second question of my thesis; what their preferred 
practical solutions are within their ideological beliefs. The short answer is that there 
are surprisingly few. Apart from the more obvious beliefs related to the religion of 
Islam if understood deeply conservative, such as death penalty for homosexuals and 
blasphemers, which have been a part of both the cultural and theological traditions of 
not only Islamic countries, but other nations and religions across the world, there is 
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little to go on if one want to truly envision a “Prophet’s Ummah”-ran state. 
Additionally, the way they present sharia with regards to how a state should look and 
run makes it a “catch-all”-argument. That is, when asked about specifics, they just 
answer with “in accordance to sharia”, or some version of this, as if simply using the 
term is an answer to the question. This is mainly visible in three of the ideas presented 
in the previous chapter: that the Islamic state should provide all the basic necessities of 
its inhabitants, the economy should be in accordance to Islamic customs and fiqh, and 
the rules for social roles and marriage. The few of the concrete laws of sharia they use 
in these three does not really answer a whole lot of practical questions. Take, for 
example, the stated requirement of the Islamic State to provide all basic necessities for 
its inhabitants. To the Prophet’s Ummah, this is where the state has the potential to end 
conflict and poverty. It is also a requirement before the full application of sharia’s 
criminal law come into effect, as it dictates that a starving man who steals cannot be 
tried under this law (Kleivan et.al. 2014). How will this come about? The only 
mention of a tax system is in Hussain’s interview, where he states that Muslims pay 
2.5% tax to the poor, and jizya is about 0.5%. This is obviously not enough to cover 
the expenses of such a welfare-heavy state that they imagine, yet other proposals for 
the running of the state are non-existent. While this might be somewhat my own fault 
for not being knowledgeable enough about Islamic practices, it might be worth to 
remember that this sharia they speak of is one of their own invention, and thus largely 
undefined until they present their policies on the matter. Their ideological spectrum of 
din wa-dawla is left largely undefined. 
More to the point, the economic system itself is a huge unknown. It is more individual 
than collectivistic, and is controlled by moral rules as well as a judicial system meant 
to cover fraud or other forms of corruption. It is not, however, expanded upon any 
more than this. It is treated as something unimportant, compared to other areas. I point 
this out as a symbol of what I believe to be an inherent uncertainty with the Prophet’s 
Ummah, namely that while they do have a clear picture of what is wrong, who is to 
blame, and what must happen, they do not have any precise suggestions. What this 
implies is debatable, but I am inclined to see this as a result of the group’s 
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organizational origin. They are not an NGO or a political party, but more or less an 
ideological collective. This is in line with other Islamist organizations like Islam4UK 
and Sharia4Belgium, as pointed out by Vidino (2015), and this seems to have impact 
on what exactly is possible for them to agree upon. This might also explain their 
choice of officially support the Islamic State. They saw an actor who actively opposed 
their perceived enemies, who founded a “nation” which they called the Islamic state 
and related it to the “lost” Caliphate, and based their newfounded society on the same 
general approach to lawmaking. The key argument in favor of such an implication is 
how the Prophet’s Ummah responded to the founding. Not only did they accept it on 
what is probably a face-value, they started actively creating videos in support of the 
state. Consider the two videos about slaves which are referred to in the previous 
chapter that surfaced after it became known that the Islamic state accepted and 
promoted such a practice.  In addition, the video “Gyldigheten av Khilafah”, where 
Ubaydullah Hussain presented his points on what constitutes an Islamic State, was 
produced solely to explain why the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq fulfilled all these 
requirements (Profetens Ummah 2014D). It would be probable to assume that the 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria will continue to inspire the Prophet’s Ummah and their 
belief in the Islamic State. 
On the last component, the acceptance and need for all Muslims to wage jihad, they 
are clear that it is a requirement, and yet somewhat ambiguous as to what it includes. 
When talking to reporters or in court, they simply refer to the ongoing war in Islam, 
and preach that the Muslims have the right to defend themselves. In addition, while the 
group has declared various attacks as beautiful and right when these have had civilian 
casualties, they still claim to be only accepting of violent jihad against military targets. 
While Hussain rejects that the Islamic State are killing civilians, only targeting those 
who work against the regime, he has on numerous occasions defended those who have 
killed innocent bystanders while carrying out different jihad-attacks. All in all, the 
group once again fit into the theoretical framework of jihad as something active, and 
they also claim that it is the duty of all “true” Muslims, just as al-Banna and Qutb 
described. Furthermore, they do defend the use of violence against those who are 
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deemed enemies of Islam, as is apparent in their defense of Al-Qaida and other such 
groups. It would, however, be more precise to say that they glorify jihad more than 
they defend it. To die as mujahedeen is “beautiful”, and one becomes a martyr to the 
rest of the ummah. To travel to the Islamic State to fight is also encouraged, perhaps 
even supported (Kleivan et.al. 2014). Yet, they are very careful with distancing those 
who do active jihad from the group itself. This is probably because of the possible 
legal ramifications for other members of the group should they be defined as a 
terrorist-group or something similar. This is another point of which more research 
would be needed on the purely practical parts of their role in having people leave the 
country to join the Islamic State. It is, however, sufficient to say that jihad is both an 
active and central part of the Prophet’s Ummah ideological beliefs. This puts them, if 
one compares them to other Islamists group, firmly within the same traditions as 
Islam4UK, which is not surprising given their ties to them, but it also makes them 
more prone to and apologetic of violence, than what is usually the case of such groups 
operating in Europe. 
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6 Conclusion 
To summarize, the Prophet’s Ummah does indeed have a coherent ideological 
foundations of which they base their beliefs. Within the context of Islamism, they 
represent an almost direct interpretation of Hassan al-Banna’s, Sayyid Qutb’s and 
Sayyid Mawdudi’s ideas. They view the contemporary world as one who is corrupt, in 
social ruin, and ruled by infidels who are intent on destroying Islam both physically 
through war, and ideologically by externally changing the Islamic faith so that 
Muslims accept other interpretations of their text influenced by non-Islamic 
philosophies. Furthermore, they believe in the creation of an Islamic State which 
follows a particular set of sharia which is both taken from the first generations of 
Muslims. In order to fulfill this dream and to withstand the enemies of Islam, both 
internal and external struggling, jihad is permitted. The founding of such a Caliphate is 
the ultimate object of the organization. 
Though they are following these ideological beliefs, and are adamant in their 
conviction, these are ideas they follow on a purely theoretical level. They show few 
clear and practical proposed solutions to societal problems, other than simply referring 
to the greater ideological belief. That is, while their descriptive and normative ideas 
are well defined within their ideological spectrum, the practical solutions are not. They 
provide little information about what type of sharia they want, what type of 
government structure the state should have, and so on. Their decision to acknowledge 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, for example, is based on the need for an Islamic 
State, not necessarily how the state operates. 
In conclusion, the Prophet’s Ummah are ideologically stable and consistent, but lack 
almost any kind of practical components when it comes to the actual practical sides of 
their proposed solutions. Future research on the Prophet’s Ummah should seek to 
uncover exactly how the group would recommend that the society they want should 
run, look like, and function. 
84 
 
Literature 
Akerhaug, Lars (2012). Det mest ekstreme islamistiske miljøet vi har sett i Norge. 
Verdens Gang, 21/09, 2012. Available from: 
[http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/braaket-om-muhammed-filmen/det-mest-
ekstreme-islamistiske-miljoeet-vi-har-sett-i-norge/a/10069268/]. Read 5/10/2014. 
Akerhaug, Lars (2013). Norsk Jihad. Muslimske ekstremister blant oss. Oslo: Kagge 
forlag. 
Askari, Hossein and Rehman Scheherazade S. (2010). “How Islamic are Islamic 
Countries?”. Global Economy Journal, vol. 10, no. 2, pp 1-40. 
Asad, Talal (1986). The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam. Georgetown University, 
Washington, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. 
Awlaki, Anwar al (2009). 44 Ways to Support Jihad. Text available from: 
[http://ebooks.worldofislam.info/ebooks/Jihad/Anwar_Al_Awlaki_-
_44_Ways_To_Support_Jihad.pdf]. Read 11/11/2014. 
Baran, Zeyno (2004). Hizb ut-Tahrir. Islam’s Political Insurgency. Washington D.C: 
The Nixon Center. 
Barth-Heyerdahl, Lars, Roar Dalmo Moltubak and Kadafi Zaman (2014). Norsk 
islamist: «Homofili en grusom sykdom som må utryddes». TV2, 26/6, 2014. Available 
from: [http://www.tv2.no/a/5747574]. Read: 20/5/2015. 
Bergström, Göran and Kristina Boréus (2012). Ch. 4 “Idé- och ideologianalys”, in 
Göran Bergström and Kristina Boréus (ed.) Textens mening och makt. Metodbok I 
samhällsvetenskaplig text-och diskursanalys. Pp. 139 – 177. Lund: Studentlitteratur 
AB. 
Bergström, Göran and Kristina Boreus (2005). Textens mening och makt.  Metodbok i 
samhallsvitenskapelig text- och diskursanalys. Lund: Studentlitteratur. 
85 
 
Berman, Sheri (2003). “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society”. Perspectives on 
Politics, vol.1, no 2, pp. 257-272.  
Bhattacherjee, Anol (2012). “Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and 
Practices”, Textbook Collection. Book 3. Published online. Available at: 
[http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/oa_textbooks/3] Read: 14/4/2015. 
Bratberg, Øivind (2014). Tekstanalyse for samfunnsvitere. Oslo: Cappelen Dam 
Akademisk. 
Byrkjedal, Mona and Morten Hopperstad (2015). “Hussain om terrorangrepene: - Bred 
enighet i islam om at hån av profeten skal straffes med døden”. Verdens Gang, 
22/02/2015. Available from: [www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/terrorangrepet-i-
koebenhavn/hussain-om-terrorangrepene-bred-enighet-i-islam-om-at-haan-av-
profeten-skal-straffes-med-doeden/a/23401315/]. Read: 15/05/2015. 
Caldwell, C. (2009). Reflections on the revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and 
the West. New York: Doubleday. 
Cronin, Audrey (2015). “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won't 
Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat”, in Foreign Affairs, vol. 94, pp. 87-98.  
van Dijk, Teun A. (1995). “Discourse analysis as ideology analysis”, in Christina 
Schäffner, and Anita L. Wenden (Ed) Language and Peace. p. 17-33. 
Euben, Roxanne L. & Muhammad Qasim Zaman (2009). Princeton Readings in 
Islamist Thought. Texts and contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Gerring, John (1997). “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis”, in Political Research 
Quarterly, vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 957-994. 
Gerring, John (2009). Case Study Research. Principles and Practices. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
86 
 
Goli, Marco, and Shahamak Rezaei (2010). Islamic radicalisation among Muslim 
youth in Denmark. Motivation, values and behavior. Centre for Studies in Islamism 
and Radicalisation (CIR) Department of Political Science. Denmark: Aarhus 
University. 
Hansen, Hendrik, and Peter Kainz (2007). “Radical Islamism and Totalitarian 
Ideology: A Comparison of Sayyid Qutb’s Islamism with Marxism and National 
Socialism”, in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, vol.8, no. 1, pp. 55–76.  
Hasan, Mehdi (2014). “What the Jihadists Who Bought 'Islam For Dummies' on 
Amazon Tell Us About Radicalization”. Huffington Post, 21/8, 2014.  
[http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi-hasan/jihadist-radicalisation-islam-for-
dummies_b_5697160.html] Read: 2/2/15. 
Holmer, Ida Nord (2014). In the name of Islam. Explaining the appeal of militant 
Salafism in a Norwegian context. MSc in Conflict Studies, Department of 
Government, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Huntington, Samuel L. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world 
order. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Husain, Ed (2009). Islamisten. Hvorfor jeg ble medlem i den radikale 
islamistbevegelsen, hva jeg opplevde og hvorfor jeg forlot den. Oslo: Humanist Forlag 
Høigilt, Jacob (2014). “Prophets in their own country? Hizb al-Tahrir in the 
Palestinian context”, in Politics, Religion & Ideology, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 504-520. 
IslamNet (2013). “Den skjulte siden av Profetens Ummah” IslamNet, 2013. Available 
from [http://www.islamnet.no/nyheter/kronikker/2342-den-skjulte-siden-av-profetens-
ummah]. Read: 22/4/2015. 
Kramer, Martin (2003). “Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?”, in Middle 
East Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 65-77.   
87 
 
Karagiannis, Emmanuel (2013). Hizb Ut-Tahrir. The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia 
of Social and Political Movements. 
Kleivan et. al (2014). “Støtter IS’ halshugging”. Verdens Gang 16/8, 2014. Available 
from: [http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/islam-debatten/stoetter-is-
halshugging/a/23275610/] Viewed 15/9/2014.   
Leirvik, Oddbjørn (2014). “Muslims in Norway: Value Discourses and Interreligious 
Dialogue”. Tidsskrift for islamforskning, vol. 8 no. 1, pp. 137 – 161.  
Lia, Brynjar (1998). The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an 
Islamic Mass Movement, 1928-1942. Reading: Ithaca Press 
Marshall, Paul (2005). Chapter: “The Rise of Extreme Shari’a”, in Paul Marshall (red) 
Radical Islam’s Rules. The Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari’a Law.  Lanham, ML: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
McCabe, Ryan and Juris Pupcenoks (2013). “The Rise of the Fringe: Right Wing 
Populists, Islamists and Politics in the UK”, in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 
vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 171-184 
Mehta, Jal (2010). “The Varied Role of Ideas in Politics: From Whether to How”, in 
Daniel Béland and Robert Henry Cox (ed.) Ideas and Politics in Social Science 
Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23-46.  
Mozaffari, Mehdi (2007). “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”, in 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 17-33. 
NRK (2012). Profetens Ummah knytter bånd til Islam4UK. Nrk.no, 02.12, 2012. 
Available from [http://www.nrk.no/ostlandssendingen/knytter-band-til-islam4uk-
1.9051165]. Read 4.4.2015.  
88 
 
Olav, Elgvin (2011). Secularists, Democratic Islamists and Utopian Dreamers. How 
Muslim Religious Leaders in Norway fit Islam into the Norwegian Political System. 
MSc in Political Science, University of Oslo. 
Osman, Mohamed Nawad Mohamed (2010). “Reviving the Caliphate in the 
Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in 
Indonesia”, in Terrorism and Political Violence, 22: 4, pp. 601 — 622. 
Pew Research Center (2005). Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and 
Western Publics. Washington: Pew Research Center. 
Pew Reserach Center (2006). The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims view 
Each Other. Washington: Pew Research Center. 
Pew Research Center (2008). Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly 
Mainstream. Washington: Pew Research Center. 
Pew Research Center (2010). Muslim Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah. 
Washington: Pew Research Center. 
Pisoiu, Daniela (2013). “Coming to Believe “Truths” About Islamist Radicalization in 
Europe”, in Terrorism and Political Violence, 25:2, p. 246-263 
Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste (2013). Åpen Trusselvurdering 2013. Politiets 
Sikkerhetstjeneste. Available at: 
[http://www.pst.no/media/58980/PSTs_tv2013_web.pdf]. Read 5/9, 2014. 
Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste (2014). Åpen Trusselvurdering 2014. Politiets 
Sikkerhetstjeneste. Available at: [http://www.pst.no/media/67044/PSTs_tv2014.pdf]. 
Read 22/3, 2015. 
Profetens Ummah (2013A). Trekk dere ut av vårt land. Published on: 
profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
89 
 
Profetens Ummah (2013B). Shariah – Islamsk lovgivning. Published on: 
profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013C). I Allahs Navn, den mest Barmhjertige, mest Nåderike. 
Published on: profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013D). Vår kjære bror – Arfan Bhatti. Published on: 
profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013E).  Utenrikspolitikk.  Published on: profetensummah.com. 
Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013F). Vestlig utdanningssystem. Published on: 
profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013G).  Islamsk utdanningssystem.  Published on: 
profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013H).  Økonomiske system.  Published on: 
profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013I).  Sannheten om Islam.  Published on: profetensummah.com. 
Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013J).  Det Islamske sosiale systemet.  Published on: 
profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013K). Martyrdom angrep treffer lokal spionbyrå i Nangarhar.  
Published on: profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2013K). 20 politimenn drept i martyrdom angrep i Logar.  
Published on: profetensummah.com. Now unavailable. 
Profetens Ummah (2014A). Slaver i Islam del 1. Video from Youtube, published 
17/11/2014. Available at: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HuOFsSHrnfA] 
90 
 
Profetens Ummah (2014B). Slaver i Islam del 2. Video from Youtube, published 
03/12/2014. Available at: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4QXs6AJm1iI] 
Profetens Ummah (2014C). Al Wala wal Bara. Video from Youtube, published 
21/12/2014. Available at: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-tlM3Dwapc]. 
Profetens Ummah (2014D). Gledelige Nyheter. Video from Youtube, published 
24/12/2014. Available at: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4OZWcNFAhhU]. 
Profetens Ummah (2014D). Gyldigheten av Khilafah. Video from Youtube, published 
31/10/2014. Available at: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkeljA9BDiY]. 
Qutb, Sayyid (2004). Milepæler. Oslo: L.S. P Forlag 
Skoglund, Peder (2014). “Ekstremismens argumentasjon. Et maskulinitetsperspektiv 
på radikalisering og hatefulle ytringer på nett”, Master thesis from UiO.  
Sveen, Anders and Einar Wigen (2013). “Salafisme på norsk”, in Nytt Norsk 
Tidsskrift, no. 13, pp 274-283. 
Sunde, Inger Marie (2013 Forebygging av radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme på 
internett. PHS Forskning 2013:1. 
Sætre, Jonas et al. (2012). “Mohyeldeen Mohammad pågripen for trugselvideo”. 
Available from: [http://www.nrk.no/norge/mohammad-pagripen-for-trugselvideo-
1.7978440]. Read 02.02.2015.  
Sørensen, Øystein (2012). Drømmen om det fullkomne samfunn. Fire totalitære 
ideologier – én totalitær mentalitet?. Oslo: Aschehoug. 
Tibi, Bassam (1998). The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New 
World Disorder. Berkeley, Calif London:  University of California Press 
Tibi, Bassam (2012). Islamism and Islam. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
91 
 
Trager, Eric (2011).  “The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a 
Liberal Egypt”, in Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 5, pp. 114-126. 
Utvik, Bjørn Olav (2006). “Religious revivalism in nineteenth-century Norway and 
twentieth-century Egypt: A critique of fundamentalism studies”. Islam and Christian–
Muslim Relations, 17 (2) pp. 143-157. 
Vidino, Lorenzo (2015). “Sharia4: From Confrontational Activism to Militancy”, in 
Perspectives on Terrorism, vol.9, no. 2, pp. 1-16. 
Wiktorowicz, Quintan (2005). Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. 
Oxford: Roman & Littlefield. 
 
 
 
